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
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**THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION.**

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**OUTLINES OF THE**

**PROMINENT CIRCUMSTANCES**

**ATTENDING THE**

**HUNGARIAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM:**

**TOGETHER WITH**

**BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES**

**OF THE**

**LEADING STATESMEN AND GENERALS WHO TOOK PART IN IT.**

**BY JOHANN PRAGAY,**

**COLONEL AND ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN THE HUNGARIAN ARMY  
UNDER KOSSUTH.**

**NEW YORK:**

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE lively sympathy which American freemen have manifested in the affairs of my betrayed, but not conquered country, as well as the circumstances that most of our statesmen generally are unknown or misapprehended abroad, has induced me, in anticipation of a more complete work, to publish this brief sketch of the prominent events of the Hungarian movements; together with biographical notices, which are as accurate as possible. My official station in the Ministry of War under the administration of Kossuth, and of Adjutant-General in the army, together with my active participation in all the important battles, enable me to give a faithful and reliable view of the whole course of the revolution.

In presenting the narrative to the noble-hearted citizens of the United States, I would again express my unbounded gratitude for the generous sympathy and hospitality which have been so promptly extended by them to my countrymen and myself.

J. P.

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THE HUNGARIAN

## HUNGARIAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.

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### I.

#### ORIGIN AND COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

THE Camarilla,\* at whose head stood the notorious Archduchess Sophia, mother of the present (glorious) Emperor who reigns under her guidance, perceived at an early date that the Hungarians would not long rest content with the new order of things established in March, 1848. Besides that they had been constantly cheated by Austria for more than two hundred years, they were urged by their love of freedom and by the sentiment which they had as it were drawn in with their mother's milk, that what was really great and good could flourish only under a popular form of government, to continued progress, and finally to complete independence. The Camarilla accordingly made extraordinary efforts in order, with a favorable

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\* See note A.



opportunity, not only to force back to its former position a nation that had often been the mainstay of the empire and the salvation of its accursed dynasty, but also to weaken it by divisions, and so incorporate it with *great and powerful Austria* that the light of liberty might not go forth from its borders into all Europe.

The fittest means to this end seemed to be to stir up the various national races against Hungary, on the pretence that this mother country was aiming to destroy their nationality, and thus distract and weaken its dreaded forces, till the moment arrived when sufficient troops could be openly sent into the country to bring it under the Austrian yoke.

The individuals to whom the leading parts in this infernal drama were allotted, were—

First,—The Arch-duke Stephen, Palatine. This ungrateful son of Hungary, in whom the nation once placed great hopes, for love of whom millions had been lavished, was about to requite these hopes and this love by preparing a second St. Bartholomew.

Second,—The renowned master of flank-movements, Joseph, Baron Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, the worn-out, cast-off love of the Arch-duchess Sophia.

Third,—Rajacsics, Metropolitan of Carlowitz, octogenarian servant of darkness.

Added to these prominent characters as supporters, were some understrappers, villains *minorum gentium*,—Urban, Hurban, Jank, Stratimirovics, Salm, Rott, Count Moritz Pálffy, etc.

First on the scene appeared Rajacsics. By a perverted use of his gifts of persuasion, this unworthy prelate was able to rouse his fanatical religious brethren so speedily against Hungary, that symptoms of the greatest excitement were developed among them as early as April. The insurrection broke out in July, and was conducted with a hate, bitterness, and cruelty such as rarely have disgraced barbarians. The misguided people attacked and burned German and Hungarian villages, murdering the inhabitants without distinction, from the child at the breast to the white-haired man of ninety. They bored out the eyes of men, cut off their flesh in strips, roasted them alive on spits, buried them up to their necks and so left them to be eaten by crows and swine. Still more horrible, crying yet louder for Heaven's vengeance,—they ripped open women big with child, and trampled the fruit of the womb before the eyes of the dying mother. I affirm on my con-

science, and without exaggeration, that hundreds upon hundreds of examples in each kind of these barbarities occurred, and that all was the work of an unnatural woman and of a priest who weekly exhorted his hearers to love each other as brethren. This awful insurrection could not be entirely checked during the campaign; for on the departure of our troops, it would break out with renewed fierceness. Important actions, in which the insurgents were almost invariably defeated by our troops under Generals Meszáros, Vetter, Kiss, Damjanics, and Perczel, took place at Szöreg, Verbasz, Törökcse, Ernestháza, Tomášovác, Temerin, Perlasz, Földvár, Kikinda, Turia, Tittel, and their famous intrenchments before St. Tomas. This latter place was taken by Perczel on the 1st of April, 1849, when six thousand Raitzes lost their lives. In all these engagements, the insurgent ranks were partly filled with men from the military frontiers, and by Servian robbers, who were hired at a florin per day by Count Mayerhoffer, a base tool of the Camarilla, and the Austrian consul in Servia. The rising in the north under Hurbán and that contemptible Hungarian magnate, Count Moritz Pálffy, did not turn out so well for the Camarilla. The Slaves, naturally gifted with more common sense

than the Raitzes, soon recognised the voices of their deceivers, and cast them off. Unhappily, such was not the case with the Wallachians of Transylvania. These wretched beings, urged on by their countrymen, Jank and Urban, and by the Saxon Salm and Rott, too readily followed nearly the same course as the Raitzes ; but I will not seek to excuse the Szeklers, who retaliated in kind. This insurrection, too, though often put down by Bern, lasted through the campaign. Its leader, Jank, as a reward for having maltreated, flayed, and murdered so many human beings, was decorated by the Czar of all the Russias with the ribbon of the second class of the order of St. Anne. The Saxons of Transylvania, the greatest enemies of Hungary and of liberty, did not personally take an active part in the disturbances, for they are a most cowardly, pitiful, little people ; but furnished abundant supplies of arms and money for all movements against us.

The Camarilla now felt itself strong enough while rebellion was raging in this wise in Hungary, and bade Ferdinand the Stupid to put forth the famous manifesto\*

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\* The reader is probably aware that by a proclamation antecedent to the one here referred to, Jellachich had been removed

reinstating Jellachich in his former offices and dignities. The Ban of Croatia, who held in readiness a rabble of

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from all his offices, and summoned to undergo an examination respecting his refractory conduct toward the Hungarian ministry. The Emperor of Austria composed his autographs and manifestoes according to the state of his affairs in this or that quarter at the time of writing. He might, indeed, in this way break former oaths and faith, but he gave himself not the least uneasiness on that score. For instance, just at the period when Jellachich was making his preparations in Croatia to act against Hungary, Italian affairs were in a very bad condition, and Vienna itself was becoming restless. The emperor dispatched General Hrabowsky with an autograph letter to the Ban to check his proceedings. Jellachich, who could not be previously advised from Vienna, was astonished, and showed General Hrabowsky nine autographs, in all of which he was encouraged to make these preparations. But what was most shameful of all, hard pressed in this conjuncture, he turned his forces against the Raitzes whom he had himself encouraged to revolt, and in the first assault on St. Tomas caused nearly the total destruction of the brave regiment Alexander, that by its self-sacrifice at the battle of Wagram against the French saved almost the whole Austrian army.

fifty or sixty thousand men which he had assembled mostly by force, and was only waiting for this signal, now entered Hungary near Letenye and marched in two columns directly upon Pesth, wasting and robbing as he went. The Hungarian troops were posted in the neighborhood of Stuhlueissenburg under Arch-duke Stephen, who left them on the approach of the enemy, in accordance with the instructions of the Camarilla, and never returned. After this treacherous withdrawal of the Arch-duke, the command of the Hungarians, who had retired to Pákozd, was undertaken by Gen. Moga, an Austrian Lieutenant Field-Marshal, who gave battle to Jellachich at that place on the 29th of September, 1849. In this battle nearly all the inhabitants of Pesth took part. Jellachich was worsted, and the larger part of his cuirassiers driven into Lake Velencze. He then applied for an armistice of three days, which was granted by Moga the first night; after its ratification he and his whole army decamped—and it may be with the knowledge of our commander.\* Although Jellachich's

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\* To give a pleasing instance of the noble Ban's way of thought, I will mention, that when honorable soldiers reproached him for this violation of the armistice, he replied: "I need keep

retreat was known next morning, immediate pursuit was delayed, and so this army, which could have been so easily taken, was suffered to escape. The fault was probably intentional with our general, who is believed to have had a full understanding with the Camarilla at that time, although he was afterwards condemned to a five years' arrest in a fortress for participating in the Hungarian revolution.

When Jellachich had been gone eight days, it was finally planned—in agreement with the Hungarian diet, but always within constitutional limits—that the main army should follow him, but no further than to the Austrian boundary. Perczel, with a small body under him, was to attack the other Croatian army under Generals Rott and Philippovics, who were approaching from Fünfkirchen, and in case of a victory to follow them up and take a position on the Croatian frontier so as to prevent any further invasion. Perczel fulfilled his orders more brilliantly

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no faith with rebels; my chief object was to make this flank movement toward Vienna." Hence comes his surname of master of flank movements, which is applied to him even by Austrian officers.

than could be expected, with a force consisting of only three new battalions of Honveds and a few sections of national guards. He pressed the enemy, who had already advanced as far as Ozora, so closely, that on the 10th of October they yielded unconditionally, 9,000 strong, as prisoners of war. This able partisan then took his appointed station on the frontier. Besides the victories of Dombo and Letenye, he fought a brilliant battle at Friedau on the 25th of November, 1848, where the Pesth volunteers won immortal glory, driving General Buric's force of 10,000 men, with a great loss in dead and prisoners, far into Styria.

The main body, as was intimated above, marched to the Austrian boundary, and dispatched thence several couriers to the Austrian Diet which was then sitting at Vienna, desiring to be called by a resolve of the Diet to the aid of Vienna and the pursuit of Jellachich. But this Diet also wishing to confine itself within strictly legal limits, debated long on the proposition and decided nothing, and so the Hungarian army was obliged to remain on the frontier an idle spectator, and, at the distance of only twenty-eight miles, to see Windischgrätz burn and cannonade the proud imperial city.

At last, on the 28th of October, Kossuth himself joined



the army. The twenty columns of fire that were seen that evening rising from Vienna seemed to call down from Heaven vengeance on the authors of all this ruin : they also proved the need of speedy aid, and Kossuth, without waiting for any thing further from the Diet, ordered the army to move toward the city—alas ! the watch-word of the day, “ too late,” was too applicable now.

By means of railroads and steamboats, all the troops stationed in Moravia, Styria, and Austria proper, had gathered about Vienna. The chief command was intrusted to Prince Windischgrätz, an aristocrat who hates the people, who commences his classification of mankind with the species baron, and holds all of less rank as nothing but *canaille*. This army, which could have been so easily destroyed at the outset, was gradually increased, solely owing to the obstinacy of the Viennese Diet, to an enormous size. Its numbers on the 28th, including the forces of Jellachich and Auersberg, amounted to 85,000. The first successful attack upon Vienna was made this day. The two best defended suburbs, Landstrasse and Leopoldstadt, were taken, which may be said to have included the conquest of the rest, since they are all connected together, and preparations had been made only against attacks from

without. Bem, general of the Garde Mobile, was wounded at this time while defending a barricade in the Jaeger Zeile, and not wishing to fall into the hands of the Austrians in the event of a surrender, which already he foresaw must take place, he left the city in the disguise of a coachman. The troops who had been under him disbanded at his departure, and consequently the column was not formed that was to be raised from the Garde Mobile, and to fall upon the rear of the imperialists from the city side, in case the Hungarians should make an attack. If, however, Bem had not retired, there would still have been great difficulties in the way, for the suburbs taken by the enemy were on the same side of the city as that on which the Hungarians had intended to operate.

On the 30th of October the Hungarians, 21,000 strong, came up with the imperialists, and in Kossuth's presence attacked them fiercely, drove them out of Fischamend and Albern, carried Mannswörth by storm, and pressed on towards Vienna, where thousands of their brethren panting for liberty awaited—half in hope, half in despair—their coming to rescue them from the hands of their destroyers.

## GÖRGEY'S PROMOTION.

Our army was still led by Gen. Moga, who, after the storming of Mannswörth, whether from ignorance, carelessness, or treachery, chose a route which, if followed, would have resulted in our capture or utter destruction. Görgey, who was there with a small command, saw the error, and directed Kossuth's attention to it and its consequences. A short halt and a brief reconnoissance clearly showed the correctness of Görgey's opinion and the imminence of the danger. The main part of the army was between the Danube and the so-called Schwarzen-Lacken, a sluggish arm of that river as broad and deep as the Danube itself. At the head of this body of water, a park of sixty guns stood ready to receive us, and ten regiments had already been sent out to gain our rear and inclose us in this defile. If Görgey had not observed the blunder, to call it by no harsher name, we should in another hour have been inevitably lost; as it was, we were able to withdraw from the trap. Kossuth, by virtue of a full power given by the Diet for this expedition, proclaimed Major Görgey on the spot commanding general of the

army he had saved. The escape from the defile was followed by a general retreat. It would have been hazarding too much to proceed against this enormous force, four times our own in number, and risk every thing on the first throw of the game, especially when, notwithstanding our near approach to the city, not the slightest demonstration was made from that quarter against the imperialists.

The army reached the frontier unmolested, and then occupied the long line of posts from Odenburg to Holics, for it was generally supposed that the enemy would not commence further operations till the ensuing spring.

#### FURTHER OPERATIONS OF THIS ARMY.

No sooner, however, had Windischgrätz sufficiently gratified himself with executions by the dozen, and guarded the bastions of Vienna with cannon, than he marched his disposable force, amounting to 72,000 men, upon Hungary. It was quite impossible to resist such a power in extended cantonments, and after several unimportant actions, Görgey ordered a general retreat to Raab in the middle of December. Here intrenchments were thrown up, on which the noblest ladies worked with their delicate

hands. Thanks! the warmest thanks be theirs—sent them from this distant land, now our home!

The early part of the winter of 1848-49 was very mild, and from this cause Görgey hoped to be able to maintain his ground behind the three rivers and his strong intrenchments, and check the further progress of the enemy. It was not so written in the book of fate. On the 20th of December the weather suddenly became intensely cold. By the 25th, the ice was so thick that a body of Austrians crossed the little Danube, and took a position with their artillery below Raab. This made Görgey's retreat necessary, which he conducted very slowly, that he might form a junction with Perczel's army, that had been meanwhile ordered up from the frontier, before reaching Pesth, and give a decisive battle. In the course of his retreat he fought the glorious battle of Babolna, where he engaged with three times his own numbers. Perczel had an unfortunate encounter, at first with Ottinger's brigade, and then with the main body of the Austrians at Moor on the 28th of December. Owing to his extremely bad dispositions on this occasion, he lost nine cannon and about three thousand dead, wounded, and missing, and would perhaps have been totally defeated, if a division of

Görgey's had not come to his succor just before the close of the engagement.

All the evil consequences of this disastrous check are to be attributed solely to Perczel. He might have united with Görgey much earlier, but placing an over-estimate upon his own merits after the defeat of Rott, he delayed as long as possible putting himself under the command of a younger general. The result was, that his best troops, the heroes of Friedau, were entirely dispersed, and the decisive battle rendered impossible. Nothing now remained for Görgey but to receive the broken remnants of Perczel's corps and slowly retire beyond the Danube. He crossed that stream at Pesth on the 5th of January, 1849, his rear-guard having fought with and again beaten the enemy's cavalry at Teth. Under the constant pursuit of the enemy, in the depth of winter, and through the most inhospitable districts of the country, Görgey afterwards conducted that series of retreats to Waitzen, Schemnicz, Neusohl, Leutshau, Eperges, and Kaschau, that made his name popular in Hungary, and in the course of which he gained decided advantages over his pursuers at Schemnicz, Iglo, and Braniczko.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1849 ON THE UPPER  
THEISS.

After the defeat of Perczel's army at Moor, the government had directed Görgey not to expose Pesth to the rage of the enemy by giving battle before that city, but to retire beyond the Danube toward Waitzen. Partly for the sake of leading off the enemy from Debreczin, the new seat of government, partly to give security to the mountain cities and the upper country, and, if possible, to destroy the army of Simonics, he was charged to move in that direction.

The remnants of Perczel's army crossed the stream at Pesth on the 1st of January. Kossuth and the government left that city on the 3d. Görgey pursued the route prescribed to him, while Perczel, reinforced by some battalions newly raised in Pesth, marched on the Theiss to protect the government and Diet. He at first established his headquarters at Szolnok, afterwards at Török St. Miklos, and extended his posts to Czibakháza to prevent the enemy from crossing the river in that quarter. This corps, numbering between six and eight thousand, had several unimportant combats with the Austrians, who followed close

upon them—sometimes beaten, sometimes beating. General Repássy was at Ujváros forming a new corps, which, together with the detachment at Tisza-Füred, amounted to nearly five thousand men. General Mészáros commanded eight thousand men at Tokay, the remnants of his army, which had been defeated by Schlick on the 4th of January at Kashau.\*

Klapka was ordered to take command of Gen. Mészáros' corps at Tokay, which he did on the 13th of January.

Encouraged by his success, Schlick began to act on the offensive, and advanced with five thousand men against

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\* Schlick had two meetings with our forces at Kashau, once under Colonel Pulsky and once under General Mészáros, in both of which we were the losers. Mészáros lost eleven cannons and drew off but 8,000 of his 16,000 men. It is right to say, however, that this corps was composed almost entirely of national guards and recruits, of whom not more than one in five had fire-arms, and that even the cannons were served by novices, and of course served badly. I should also mention, that the 8,000 missing were neither killed nor taken prisoners—for Schlick did not leave his defensive position to follow them—but dispersed to their homes.



our position. The battle of the 22d at Torczal, and of the 23d at Bodrogkeresztur, were in extremely cold weather. Schlick, in spite of all his military stratagems, was defeated in both with a great loss in dead and wounded, and was forced back to Szántó.\* When he saw that he could effect nothing either by his strength or his tricks, he asked for a reinforcement, and obtained one of six thousand men under General Schulczig, who advanced from Miskolcz on the 27th of January. Klapka, whose main business was to prevent a passage of the Theiss, retired behind that river to Rakamaz on Schluczig's approach. He then took such admirable measures, that when the hostile generals, with their combined forces, attempted a passage on the 31st, they were not only vigorously repulsed, but obliged to with-

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\* We had Württemberg Hussars in this corps. Schlick had formerly been colonel of their regiment. He therefore employed various artifices to lead them away from us, and once even came among them in person; but our hussars, influenced by their old feelings of respect, suffered him to retire in safety. At another time his men showed a white flag, as if they would come over to us; but when our men approached to fraternize, opened upon them with a murderous fire.

draw from that region altogether.\* A few days after, Dembinsky arrived at Rakamaz, and took command of the corps of Klapka and of Kazinczy.

Dembinsky was harsh and querulous from the very first. When reviewing the troops, he found fault with a new battalion because they could not present arms. "No, general, they cannot," replied their commander, a brave, straightforward soldier, "but they can level their bayonets and charge; they proved\*they could do that day before yesterday."

We were well informed that Görgey was marching to Kaschau, and that Schlick and Schulzig were hurrying as fast as possible in the same direction, in order to escape

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\* I had an opportunity shortly after, of reading an intercepted dispatch from Schlick, in which he gave a report of this affair to his commander-in-chief. It says: "They had obtained large reinforcements—five or six battalions of regulars and several battalions of Honveds were in the fight." This is all false. We had only one very weak battalion of old regular soldiers in the corps, and it took no part in the engagement. Those who seemed to him so numerous, and by whom he was beaten, were barely two battalions of Honvéds. See note B.

either to Szepai or Jászo. Klapka, upon his own urgent representations, was charged to follow this corps by forced marches. Dembinsky himself, with the remainder of the forces, proposed moving toward Putnok, to cut them off, if, as was probable, they should take that road. The first part of this arrangement was immediately put in execution. The rear-guard of Schlick was overtaken on the 8th of February at Hidas-Némethi, where he had thrown up barricades behind the Hernát. Notwithstanding the cold was so intense that our boots were frozen in the stirrups, and although we had been marching since early in the morning, and the day was now far advanced, Klapka ordered an assault at four in the afternoon upon the enemy's very strong position. At six the burning bridge over the Hernát, and half an hour afterwards the barricades of Hidas-Némethi, were carried, and that too by raw volunteers. The enemy made such good thrift with the darkness, that we were unable to trace them that night. We discovered next day, to our great joy, that they had gone toward Szepai, and so fallen into the snare. To prevent any escape, Klapka sent Colonel Dessewffy with a brigade to Enyiczke and Buzinka, while he proceeded to Kaschau and joined Görgey on the 10th of the month. During the

night of the 10th, a messenger came in from Dembinsky with orders for Klapka to leave the further pursuit of Schlick to Gen. Görgey, and return as speedily as possible with his own troops to Miskolcz, where he would receive further directions. In pursuance of this order, we started on our backward march, and reached Miskolcz on the 14th, the very day on which Dembinsky, in consequence of his imperfect dispositions, had suffered Schlick after a short encounter to escape in the direction of Tornallya, and brought from the field, instead of the whole corps, only a few baggage-wagons as trophies of victory.

As the Austrian main army had entered Hatvan, Klapka was commissioned to go forward on the Pesth road and await in Mezzökövesd accounts from the other *corps d'armée*. At this place, meanwhile, Klapka learned that the enemy had halted, and that their advanced guard of several divisions of cuirassiers were taking their ease in the castle of Count Károly at Kompolt. A surprise was immediately planned. Our cavalry came suddenly upon them in the night of the 18th, killed a portion of them, and took the rest prisoners. Because Klapka had managed this surprise without first obtaining Dembinsky's approval; because, in the course of a five day's residence

at Mezzökövesd, he had ridden into Miskolcz one afternoon to consult with his general upon future operations, and not finding him there, had left a brief statement of his views in writing; finally and mainly, because on this occasion he held a long conversation with Görgey, who was an old garde-comrade, Dembinsky, who could never rid himself of the mistrust that seems a second nature to almost all Poles, and who suspected in this conversation plots against himself, became excessively irritated, and shortly after wrote him an official letter in the harshest style, wherein he threatened to send that officer to a court-martial at Debreczin to answer for having acted on his own authority, and left his station. In reference to the written statement, he added: "You are to have views upon nothing; you have only to execute what is prescribed to you." Görgey was at a later day honored with a similar missive. This may have been in part the cause that the necessary harmony was wanting in all the after operations, and that the battle of Kápolna did not fully answer previous expectations. The chief cause, however, of the succeeding failures is to be looked for in Dembinsky's absurd dispositions, in his extreme forgetfulness and obstinacy, and in his wretched selection of a general staff. From Mezzö-

köved, Klapka was ordered to Bakta, to close the pass there against Schlick, who was in Pétervásár. On reaching there, he received from persons on whom he could rely accurate information of Schlick's condition, and how he could be surprised and routed. He immediately took measures accordingly. Máriássy was commissioned to go around Pétervásár towards Mindszent; but at the same time early notice of the arrangements was sent to the commander-in-chief at Erlau. Dembinsky's answer was nearly in the manner of the letter referred to above. It strictly forbade Klapka to put his arrangements in execution. This prohibition came to hand at three o'clock in the night. Máriássy's column was already five hours on its way, and could not be countermanded before five in the morning, the hour fixed upon for the attack. There was nothing to be done but to advance towards Pétervásár, and, if Máriássy had in our absence brought the entire force of the enemy on himself, to furnish such aid as he might stand in need of, but otherwise not to co-operate actively. That officer, on his part, succeeded to his wishes, and was already at that place with his artillery before his presence was perceived. The confusion in the hostile ranks may be

imagined. But the affair was all on one side, for the enemy could retire at their pleasure. Máriássy, embarrassed by the non-appearance of Klapka, contented himself with spiking the guns in the market-place, and left the town, after killing a few of its defenders. Schlick was this time saved by Dembinsky's obstinacy, as he had formerly escaped through his blunders.

The Austrian army was gradually drawing near, and Dembinsky resolved to hazard a decisive engagement. Klapka's corps was accordingly brought into line behind Tarna, one division under Klapka was transferred to Verpeleth, another under Máriássy to Kápolna, Schulz's brigade stood in reserve at Szolnok, Répássy's corps was ordered on the 27th to Kompolt, one division of Görgey's army to Kápolna, two others to Felső-Döbrö and Also-Döbrö, to take their place in the line of battle. Two other divisions were to form a reserve.

The enemy, meanwhile, attacked Kápolna, at noon of the 26th, with a superior force. Máriássy held his ground bravely, and the battle, with changing fortune, lasted till late into the night. The Austrians twice carried the village, and were as often expelled, finally leaving it in our possession. On the 27th Schlick forced his way through the pass of

Sirok—driving back the detachment sent by Dembinsky to guard it, and fell upon our right flank, while others of the enemy were marching from Nánár and Véc̄s against our centre. Klapka's corps had to bear alone the brunt of the first assault, for the other corps had not then come into line, and was forced from its position before succor arrived. An unpardonable error had been committed; let those who deserve it bear the blame. On a line of battle extending fifteen miles, while the enemy were acting with their entire strength, there were not at any one time more than three of our divisions engaged, the others never appeared till the first had been driven back. So matters went through the day, until the demonstrations of our reserve in the afternoon put a limit to the enemy's progress. There was hard fighting on both sides during the day and a half that this battle lasted, but had our troops been better directed the issue had assuredly been in our favor.

Windischgrätz's force amounted to about sixty thousand; we numbered not quite forty thousand. Besides the almost total destruction of a regiment of Uhlans and the Italian battalion Zanini, the enemy spiked and left behind in Kápolna eight cannon on the first day, and lost nearly four thousand in dead and wounded. Our loss in dead,



wounded, and missing was greater by some two hundred than theirs. At the close of the action we took position on the heights behind Kerecsend, but were mostly ordered back the same night to Mezzökövesd. The remaining troops followed the next day, and were no sooner come into line than the enemy renewed the attack with five large bodies of cavalry, but were met so warmly by our brave Wilhelm and Palatinal hussars that they were fain to go back leaving their guns to our care. The night passed quietly, and we were eagerly waiting, from hour to hour, for orders to advance. What, then, was our astonishment, when we received, at eight o'clock the next morning, commands to fall back to Poroszló, and thence behind the Theiss, in the following order :—Klapka's corps and the division of Szekulic's to Egerfarmas ; the corps of Aulich—he having meantime taken command of that of Gen. Repássy—to St. István ; Görgey's corps to Mezző-Keresztes. The movement was to begin immediately. What was to be done ? We could only obey ; and accordingly broke up and set forward on our various routes. I went with Klapka to Egerfarmas. I should premise that the enemy were at Szijhalon and Szemere, which Dembinsky must have known as well as we. Now I wish to ask if a flank-

march, rendered additionally difficult by the nature of the ground, should be executed in broad day and in close proximity to the enemy? He will be somewhat troubled to give an answer. The consequences too soon demonstrated the hazardous character of a movement planned in defiance of all military rules. After overcoming great obstacles we reached Egerfarmas in the afternoon of the 3d of March. The troops were literally packed together on an open field behind the town, the only standing place that could be found for them. When the necessary guards had been set, the members of the staff—to which I had the honor of belonging—who, as well as the men, had scarcely eaten for three days, repaired to a noble proprietor of the district who, the quarter-master reported, was getting ready a splendid banquet for us.

The worthy quarter-master was not deceived. We were called to the table as soon as we had entered the mansion. But we had hardly seated ourselves and taken the first mouthful, when a twelve pound ball dropped into the courtyard, somewhat disturbing the silent but very agreeable operations of our noble staff. We hurried out, sprang to horse, and found that the enemy at Szemere, without the trouble of moving, had placed six batteries in a half

circle, and turned their concentrating fire upon our way-worn, famished troops. Egerfarnas was so miry, and the neighborhood so marshy, that with eight horses to each, we were unable to bring any but three pounders into use, while the whole battery from Szemere was playing upon us. If the Austrians had only shown a little vigor, and sent a column towards Tárkány, with orders to attack immediately on gaining our rear, not one thousand of our eighteen thousand would have escaped—for there was no room for necessary evolutions—and as to our fifty-eight cannons—! But they permitted us to march off very comfortably, and were even so courteous as to refrain from pursuit. For this politeness I return thanks, in my own name, and for the batteries which I had drawn out one by one from the mud, two hours after midnight, under the simple escort of eight young hussars. We went to Tisza-Füred on the 2d of March. On the 3d, a council of war was held, under the presidency of Görgey, in which the assembled officers expressed their want of confidence in Dembinsky, who, in consequence, resigned the same day. On the 8th of the month Görgey recrossed the Theiss, Klapka marched to Szolnok, and Aulich remained in Tisza-Füred.

## II.

VICTORIOUS ADVANCES OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMY IN MARCH  
AND APRIL, 1849.

THE surprise near Szolnok, conducted by Damjanics and Vécsey, with Klapka as a reserve, met with complete success. The enemy, under Generals Karger and Ottinger, were partly dispersed, partly driven into the river Zagyva. Besides nearly five hundred prisoners, we took most of their cannon, many military wagons, chests, etc. This surprise, the favorable result of which was mainly owing to Damjanics' troops, who made the first charge upon the Austrians with the greatest bravery, and then the battle before the place itself, were the beginning of that brilliant series of victories by which, in battles and skirmishes following each other in quick succession, the Austrians were totally routed, and forced to vacate the capital and most of the upper districts of the country. This day was also a day of knowledge, for there our young troops learned that, conscious of the sacredness of their cause, they were a match for the more skillful and stronger forces of the

enemy. This knowledge inspired them with courage for the performance of deeds that shall never be forgotten in the history of Hungary—nor in the history of Europe. After this victory Kossuth came to the head-quarters, held a review, particularly of those battalions that had distinguished themselves, thanked them, with glowing eloquence, in the name of their country, and summoned them to further deeds of like glory.

It was now determined to resume the offensive, which had for a time, through Dembinsky's errors, been changed to the defensive. The plan was, that Görgey, who had already crossed the Theiss, should move in the direction of Gyöngyös, and that the army of 30,000, concentrated at Czibakháza, near Szolnok, under Gen. Vetter, should pass Nagy-Körös, and operate upon Pesth. Accordingly, on the 22d of March, the latter army crossed the Theiss at Czibakháza; but when they learned that the enemy were gathered between 70 and 80,000 strong at Körös, they relinquished their design, and returned behind the Theiss. It was then resolved in a council of war, at which Kossuth was present, that the two armies should operate together towards a common centre. Vetter, whose corps was sent towards Tisza-Füred, was at this time seized with a fever,

and there being no hope of his speedy recovery, President Kossuth, who was still on the ground, named Görgey provisional commander-in-chief. We once more passed the Theiss on the 27th of March, and on the 2d of April came abreast of Görgey's division—now under Gen. Gáspár—advancing on the direct post-road to Pesth. The same day Gáspár fought with the Austrians for six hours, and drove them behind Hatvan; except the taking of Hatvan, this battle had no important results.

Kossuth was now permanently with the army. In a council of war, held on the 3d of April, Klapka proposed the plan—afterwards so successfully executed—of flanking Gödöllő, a position where a very small force could hold whole armies in check, and which was the very key of Pesth. In pursuance of this design, the corps under Klapka as the advance, Damjanics in the centre, and Aulich in the rear, marched on the 4th towards Tápiobicske. Our scouts all agreed in stating that Tápiobicske was defended by only two battalions and one battery. Klapka, in his ardor, and in the consciousness of his strength, neglected the necessary precautions, and ordered his whole army across the only bridge over the Tápio, a fenny, unfordable stream. Between the river and the village, situated at the

foot of a mountain, fifteen hundred paces distant, are nothing but quicksands. When he was come near enough to the place, he gave orders to storm without further examination. But to our astonishment, every house was suddenly changed to a redoubt, and numberless batteries opened upon us from the mountain back of the village. We had been sorely deceived. Jellachich's entire corps, to which was added Rastich's brigade, lay here in ambush. It was fortunate for us that they discovered themselves so quickly, otherwise our first battalions might have been utterly destroyed. As it was, they saved themselves with a trifling loss.

Nevertheless, the sudden appearance of the enemy on all sides had so injurious an effect on our men, that after a short resistance, they began to retreat, and many battalions ran in confusion to the bridge. Klapka himself was cut off from the main body, and had, with a portion of his suite, ridden into a quagmire, where he stuck fast. His safety was owing to a cap and coarse cloak which he had taken with his own hands from a conquered Serbian, and worn throughout the winter campaign. He was supposed from his dress to be one of the new recruits, rather than a general. When Damjanics' corps, especially the

brave 3d and 9th battalions, came up, affairs took a different turn. These two battalions at the head, broke their way through the fugitives, and amid the cross-fire of the enemy on the causeway, carried the bridge at one charge, and restored the fight. In less than half an hour, they not only recovered all advantages from the enemy, but forced them to retire from the village. The scattered troops of Klapka were rapidly collected, and aided effectively in driving the enemy from their very strong position on the mountain, where they made an obstinate resistance, and pursued them till nightfall. The loss in this action, which lasted nearly ten hours, was quite large, amounting on both sides to more than 1,000 killed and wounded.

That they might have no rest, we followed close upon their tracks. On the 5th of April we learned that the entire Austrian army was concentrated near Isaszeg, under Windischgrätz. Dispositions for a general engagement were accordingly made. A column was sent out towards Pétsel on the left, under General Dessewffy, to turn the hostile flank, which, however, owing to the difficulties of the ground, did not reach its destination till after the enemy were beaten. Windischgrätz's main body, with 120 cannon, occupied the heights behind Isaszeg—a position



that might well be called the Gibraltar of the country—and also the village and forest in front. Klapka approached by the road from Sáp, Damjanics from Kóka, Aulich forming a reserve between the two towards the woods before Isaszeg. About noon began a murderous fire, and the charge upon the forest. Our troops fought heroically, and carried the woods three times, but were as often expelled by the greatly superior force opposed to them. At last, reinforced by Aulich's corps, and the cavalry of Gáspár who had come up from Tura, they bore down all resistance, not only clearing the woods at one charge, but entering the village which was now burning in at least ten different places. And now all the fierce horrors of the fight were displayed. Along the whole line of battle, for an extent of at least five miles, there was an incessant firing of artillery and small arms, and constant charges and attacks. When our column came out from the woods, they became exposed to a destructive fire from the heights; but careless of this, and with a singular contempt of death, they stormed the enemy's stronghold. Before nightfall, the tricolor was planted on the hostile works, and waved out gloriously in the last beams of the setting sun. The Austrians, who, trusting to what they believed an impreg-

nable position, had perhaps fought better than on any other occasion during the war, were beaten on all sides, and nothing but the coming darkness saved them from utter rout. Our troops, much exhausted by forced marches and by the fatigues of the day, were in great need of repose. They accordingly bivouacked. The pursuit was left to a few divisions of cavalry. The loss on both sides was several thousand in dead and wounded, but that of the enemy by far the largest. We had now become masters of the railroad from Pesth to Szolnok.

Early the next morning, we again hastened forward, both Hungarian armies directing their course to Gödöllő, the last tenable position of the enemy between us and Pesth ; but as the loss of Isaszeg exposed their flank, they had forsaken it and retreated early in the day to Pesth, where they threw up strong intrenchments, and prepared for defence. We came just upon Kerepes' rear, which left us the field after a short encounter. Further pursuit was not in our plan ; besides that our men could hardly be said to have eaten or slept since leaving Tápiobicske, and needed rest.

All now was busy at our head-quarters in Gödöllő. Kossuth was there with some of his ministry and deputies from the Diet, who were preparing to declare the Indepen-

dence of Hungary and the banishment of the Austria Dynasty. Their purpose was made known to the army who received its announcement with the greatest enthusiasm. Kossuth and his associates immediately returned to Debreczin, in order to take proper measures in reference to this important subject. On the 14th of April, 1849, the representatives of the Hungarian nation met in the Protestant church at Debreczin. Kossuth, in an eloquent address, reported the late victories, presented the rights and claims of Hungary, the abuses and perfidy of Austria, and called upon the Diet and the assembled people, in the name of their country and of God, to shake off the fetters that had bound them for three centuries, and take their place among the independent nations. The following propositions were then unanimously adopted :—

“ 1. Hungary with all its legal provinces and counties should be proclaimed as a free, independent, and self-sufficient state, whose integrity and unity can never be attacked.

“ 2. The dynasty of Hapsburg-Lorrain, whose treachery and perfidiousness took up arms against the Hungarian nation, which tried to divide the country, to annihilate the holy constitution, to produce hatred between the different

racés, and which was even so shameless as to make use of a foreign power (Russia) to butcher a whole nation, which in this way has torn in pieces the Pragmatic sanction, which has violated every mutual treaty, this faithless dynasty of Hapsburg-Lorraine, should be deposed forever as ruler in Hungary and all its legal provinces and countries, should be exiled and banished forever from all the territories of Hungary, and should never be allowed the privilege of Hungarian citizenship. This banishment should be proclaimed in the name of the whole Hungarian nation.

"3. The Hungarian nation being, by a holy, unalienable right, self-subsistent, free, and independent, may proclaim its decided will to keep peace and friendship with all nations of the world, so long as its rights are not violated; to keep particularly peace and friendship with those people who were before united with Hungary, under the same ruler; also with the neighboring Turkish and Italian countries, and to make treaties and alliances with them founded on mutual interests.

"4. The future system of government with its particularities shall be deliberated and decided by the National Assembly. Until the new principles of government are

deliberated upon and accepted, a president, with responsible ministers, should be elected and invested with the executive power.

"5. A committee of three members should be authorized to publish a manifest of this resolution and its principles."

In order as soon as possible to relieve Comorn, which had been hardly pressed since December of the preceding year, and at the same time to hold in check and constantly harass the hostile army in Pesth and Ofen, our forces were disposed as follows :—The corps of Klapka, Damjanica, and Gáspár, under the lead of Görgey, were to draw off to Comorn ; Aulich, with his own corps, and the division of Vimety and Asboth, was to keep watch of Pesth. Görgey departed for Comorn on the 8th of April, while Aulich remained behind ; and, having defeated the Austrians in four different actions, obliged them to evacuate Pesth ; but they left a garrison of between 5 and 6,000 men, under Gen. Henzy, in the fortress of Ofen.

On the 9th of April, Görgey marched against Waitzen, with the full knowledge that the town was held by 12,000 Austrians, under generals, the Prince Jablonovsky, Göcz, and Fidler. They were also fully informed of our approach,

and stood awaiting us drawn up behind a row of sand hills. Damjanics, who was then leading the advance, attacked them as soon as he came in sight, without waiting for the others to come up, and pushed them so hotly, in spite of a violent rain, that when Klapka appeared on the right wing they were already wavering, and soon after began their retreat. They were closely followed into the town, which was taken by storm. They again formed on the heights outside, but were routed, after a fight of two hours, and driven to Veröcze. We took a number of cannons and military wagons, and about 500 prisoners. Gen. Göcz, and several hundred of less rank, lay dead on the field. Our loss, in killed and wounded, was not more than thirty at the utmost.

On the 10th, we continued on our course towards Comorn, choosing the mountain road for greater security. This region was quite clear from the enemy. It was not till we were about crossing the Gran, at Levenecz, that we observed their outposts on the opposite bank. They had partly carried and partly burned the bridges on this stream. We thought that we had now met with a most serious difficulty. The stream, naturally very rapid, was greatly swollen. There were no materials at hand for constructing

a bridge, and the river was commanded from an admirable position on the other side.

Nevertheless, we, resolved to do our best, collected mills,\* house-roofs, barrels, and timbers, and commenced our building at Obars and Levenecz, at which latter place we completed a structure at the end of three days.

The enemy let us work at our pleasure without the least disturbance, nay even marched away before our eyes during the building of the bridge. If Wohlgemuth did not enjoy the reputation of being one of the cleverest generals in Austria, I should say he was one of the stupidest in the world. I am to this day unable to understand how one can allow an opponent to throw a bridge over a stream, some fifty fathoms broad, and pass his troops over it on their way to relieve a closely-besieged fortress. Indeed, I shall feel under obligations to any one who will make me acquainted with the principles of tactics or strategy which the aforesaid general applied to the case in question. The corps of Klapka and Damjanics consumed the whole of the 18th in crossing the tottering bridge, which threatened

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\* The small river or floating mills are of course here meant.

every moment to give way, and we did not reach Lök till late in the evening. Here we were universally assured that the enemy had gone down to the city of Gran, which we were the more ready to believe from having seen them start in that direction.

We were pursuing our march on the 19th, with Klapka in advance, when the commander in front sent back an officer, with the astounding report, that a very large body of the enemy was drawn up in order of battle near Grosz-Sarló. We galloped forward, and saw, with our own eyes, what we found it difficult to believe from the mouth of another—a strong army, with its right wing resting on the town, its left on the range of mountains, and its centre supported by a forest. We had made no dispositions for such an occurrence as this; Görgey was still behind at Levenecz, Gáspár's corps had not yet even crossed the Gran. But, not stopping long to deliberate, we charged upon the much superior force thus suddenly opposed to us. In the beginning the battle swayed doubtful, now hither, now thither; now we had no left wing, and now no centre; but the bravery of our soldiers supplied all deficiencies, and 22,000 new recruits, without preparation, defeated 34,000 choice Austrian troops, fully provided with artillery,



and commanded by the ablest generals.\* The battle was first decided on our left answering to the hostile right wing. Damjanics went around the town, which was defended by four battalions, two rocket and four field batteries, while Kazinczy carried it by a masterly assault. The garrison defended themselves with desperation. Every room, every cellar and door-way, had to be stormed separately, but stormed they were, and the occupants either cut down or taken prisoners,—but few made their escape. When the enemy had lost this support, they threw themselves violently in strong columns upon our centre, striving their utmost to break it through and disperse our troops. A large flanking column of cavalry partly broke their left wing, that had already been shaken by the taking of the town, and was not yet perfectly restored, and flanked their centre. This, and the coming up of two of our batteries, at not more than three hundred paces distant from their main column, causing fearful destruction in its ranks, forced them to abandon their design and commence a retreat; otherwise they could

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\* Wohlgemuth and Benedek.

have easily succeeded, for our centre was almost without artillery. They were hotly pursued. The commander of our extreme right neglected to keep close by the vineyards on his side. The error had nearly given a new turn to the fortunes of the day, for, when we least looked for such an event, we were assaulted in flank and rear by 8,000 men. There was at first a little confusion in this wing ; but it would yield in nothing of bravery to the rest, turned fiercely back on the assailants, and in less than an hour not only repulsed them but even cleared the wood whither they had retired after the first onset. The retreat now became general ; the pursuit was kept up till ten at night.

This last mentioned body of 8,000 men, under Gen. Herzinger, mostly grenadiers, arrived on the ground from the imperial head-quarters, at Olmütz, just as the battle was decided.\* They were on the point of withdrawing, when they marked the oversight of our right wing, and hoped,

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\* The embarrassment of the Austrian court may be imagined, when it found itself obliged to send a portion of the body-guard into the field.

by a rapid movement against flank and rear, to recover what was lost. The experiment proved an unhappy one. As we rode over the field with Gen. Klapka, we came upon a company of grenadiers who had all been dreadfully wounded in the feet by our guns. The general noticed their uniform, and asked who was their commander; they answered, "Captain Klapka." He was the general's much-loved brother! In this unhappy war, there were thousands of such instances, where father strove against son, and brother against brother.

The enemy lost, in this battle, besides some thousands killed, 3,000 prisoners and a number of cannon. Our loss, in killed and wounded, was not far from 800. The laurels of the day are mainly due to artillery. There were batteries of six cannons, in which, after five were dismounted, the sixth was still actively served. No further opposition was offered after this action, and we held on our course undisturbed to Comorn, which was still undergoing a continuous bombardment. A few days before our arrival, Gen. Guyon, the newly-appointed commandant, attended by only one squadron of hussars, had broke his way through the whole besieging army, and made good his entrance into the fortress.

## III.

## RELIEF OF COMORN.

THAT portion of the besiegers who were on the left bank of the Danube withdrew at our' approach. On the day of our arrival Gen. Guyon sallied out into the Schütt,\* and drove the enemy behind Aranyos. It only remained, therefore, to clear the right bank, where was the main body of the Austrians, and whence the bombs flew constantly into the city and fortress. The restoration of the bridge of boats over the Danube, that had formerly connected the fortress with the *tête du pont*, but had long since been shot away, was immediately taken in hand, and completed in three days, that is, on the 25th of April, in spite of an uninterrupted shower of bombs and balls.†

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\* The Schütt is a large island formed by the Danube and an arm of that river.

† The design of the enemy was to destroy, if possible, our works upon the bridge, of which they commanded a view from

The same evening eight picked battalions, led by Colonel Knezics, were ordered over the bridge. At two hours after midnight they stormed the hostile works opposite the fortress, which were already in the second parallel, captured all their defenders, and seized all their guns. While the darkness continued, the same battalions stormed Old and New Szöny, two places opposite the fortress, took many additional prisoners, and large supplies of war materiel. At four in the morning the *armée-corps* began to cross the bridge. At eight o'clock the battle commenced, in which the Austrian main army, including the besieging force, under the chief command of Lieutenant Field-Marshal Velden, who had been appointed in place of Windischgrätz, engaged against the *corps d'armée* of Klapka and Damjanics, and the troops of the garrison. Görgey's dispositions were so imperfect, that our old choice troops, that is, those of his former corps, together with the best artillery and

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their elevated position. They accordingly discharged bombs and balls upon us day and night—the bombs with short matches, so that they all exploded over our heads, and killed and wounded some of our workmen.

cavalry were just passing the river at evening, when our general staff were returning to the city after the victory. Had they, especially the cavalry, co-operated in the action, the enemy might, perhaps, have this time been pursued to Vienna.—Was Görgey already cherishing treacherous purposes? The fight began on the high grounds before New Szöny, and, notwithstanding the great superiority of those opposed to us, was there immediately decided in our favor; but the further back the enemy were driven, the better and more elevated were the positions which they successively occupied, and obstinately defended. Their left wing finally entered the woods before Acs, with their centre turning towards Puszta-Herkály, and their right wing to Nagy and Kis-Igmand. It was two in the afternoon, when General Nagy Sándor, commander of the cavalry, received orders to flank the enemy's right wing, and drive them over the Csoneczó, which would have made a general retreat necessary. But this brave general, pushing forward with too much ardor, suddenly brought our cavalry into a formidable cross-fire. Its flank was at the same time turned by Schlick's corps. A retreat, in utter confusion, was the result. The presence of Görgey's cavalry, at this juncture, had been of the utmost importance.

When the infantry had recovered the advantages lost by this disaster, the fighting ceased on both sides, on account of the extreme heat, and each party encamped. During the engagement we captured a number of cannons, took many prisoners, and gained possession of two camps, with more than 3,000 tents, and the camp utensils. The enemy's loss, in dead and wounded, was over 4,000; ours not quite 1,000. During the night the Austrians crossed the river, and passed the frontier. How easily they might have been destroyed on this occasion—how easily we might have taken Vienna! What advantages would have accrued from that event, not only to Hungary, but to Europe at large! These things every honest man at that time saw. But Görgey contented himself with sending Gáspár's corps to Raab, and a division, under Kosztolányi, to the Schütt; and, after remaining eight days longer before Comorn, leisurely proceeded to the siege of Ofen.

The government, meanwhile, had perceived that the credit of these important victories was not due to Görgey, who had not made the dispositions, nor been personally present in most of the actions, but to the good management of the subordinate generals, and to the bravery of the soldiers. They were also inclined to blame him for having,

in defiance of their urgent recommendation, omitted to follow up the enemy with vigor. The attempt was therefore made to remove him, in a handsome manner, from the army, and he was appointed minister of war. He accepted the appointment, but excused himself from immediately entering on its duties, on the ground that there were no generals in the army to whom he could safely intrust the chief command. He desired, meantime, to send Gen. Damjanics as his substitute in the ministry of war. When this general, who was a great eye-sorrow to him, and whom he had misled by all sorts of deceptive representations to undertake the provisional administration of that office, broke his foot the very day before his intended departure, he prevailed upon Klapka to take his place, in order to remove this genius also, of whose popularity with the army he was jealous. Klapka left for the seat of government the same day that the three armies set out on their march to Ofen.



## IV.

## THE BOMBARDMENT OF PESTH AND STORMING OF OFEN.

THAT they might not expose the fairest city in Hungary to a needless bombardment, our blockading army did not make their entrance into Pesth until the Austrians had left of their own accord. The commandant of the hostile fortress of Ofen, which stands on the opposite bank of the Danube, assured the inhabitants that he would not bombard their city so long as the first cause of provocation did not come from their side. Hence every thing was avoided on the part of the Hungarians that might bring ruin upon this beautiful place. For the purpose of connecting with Görgey's army that had meantime appeared on the Ofen bank, and because the chain bridge was commanded by the enemy, and indeed partly taken away, a new bridge was built lower down the stream. Görgey took command of all the blockading troops, distributed them on the heights about Ofen, and fixed his headquarters on the so-called Scwhabenberg. He then summoned the command-

ant of Ofen to surrender within forty-eight hours, and bade him beware of bombarding Pesth, as no operations would proceed from that quarter—threatening if the old arrangement in this respect were broken, to put the entire garrison to the sword when the fortress was taken. The commandant returned in answer that he should hold out to the last, but should not bombard the city so long as it gave him no occasion. But when did a mercenary tool of the Austrian Camarilla ever keep his plighted word? Never when it was against his real or supposed interest. Here is one of many proofs. Henczy bombarded Pesth without the least provocation, and changed the elegant row of buildings on the river, and the finest streets and squares into heaps of ruins—for it, may he be accursed !\* It was not till this answer was received that Görgey sent to

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\* Even after the first Hungarian banners were planted on the fortress, the Austrians, from a mere love of destruction, were preparing to blow up the still unfinished, elegant chain-bridge, and were only prevented by the engineer, Claire, who countermined them, and drenched their materials with water. This may serve to show the natural readiness of the Austrians for acts of Vandalism.

Comorn for the proper besieging materials—an act of negligence that has much the air of guilt—for he could easily have brought what was necessary with him. When at last these arrived, the battering cannon were set up and a breach attempted. An attack upon the fortified aqueduct, and one upon the fortress itself, under the gallant Colonel Vimety, failed of success. But when the first breach was made our men could no longer be restrained. When they looked down on Pesth, which lay in ruins, they were mastered with such a fierce bitterness, and when they looked up at the rocky fortress, the sweet hope of vengeance beckoned them so fairly, that, in their hot impatience for the combat, the battalions actually quarreled with each other for the privilege of joining the first column that should storm. The dispute had finally to be settled by lot. At two o'clock, in the morning of the 21st of May, the assault began upon the breach, and by means of scaling ladders, on all sides of this fortress, perched upon a rock rising a thousand feet above the Danube. Two hundred and forty-seven cannons, and from 5 to 6,000 small arms, vomited out death and ruin upon the assailants—but nothing could damp the ardor of their vengeance. They clung, and crept, and sprang like squirrels from ladder to rock, from crag to

ladder. Here and there a ball would strike a ladder, with a man grasping every round, and hurl all into the abyss. In this way Colonel John Máriássy was thrice cast down ; though severely wounded, he climbed again, for the fourth time, and happily succeeded in gaining the fortress. At seven in the morning the first tricolor was floating from the battlements ; at eight the conquest was complete ; at nine there was only a search for those who had crawled into hiding-places. Instead of killing 6,000 men, we made 5,000 prisoners. Who shall prevent the feeling of revenge from being soon appeased—who shall check the rising pity, natural to every true man, at the sight of a conquered, kneeling enemy ? Henczy received a fatal wound, of which he died the same day. The self-sacrificing bravery of his defence was worthy of a better cause.

Görgey remained at Ofen several weeks, and then marched towards Comorn, to act against the enemy who were now collected there with reinforcements from all quarters.

OPERATIONS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF COMORN IN THE  
MONTHS OF JUNE AND JULY, 1849.

When our government found that the Russian intervention was a settled matter, the ministerial council fixed upon the following system of defence :—Dembinsky should protect Upper Hungary against the Russian invasion,—the main army resting on Comorn ; the right should extend to the mountain cities, the left to the Bakony range ; the southern army, under Vetter, was to remain in Baksa on both sides of the Danube, until Bem, with a part of his forces from Transylvania, should be advanced on a line with the other armies, when he was to take the chief command and resume the offensive. It was additionally resolved to form an army of reserve, at Szolnok, and also arranged that 22,000 troops, under Klapka's command, should be disposed in a fortified camp at Comorn : if the main army were repulsed and pursued these were to operate in the rear.

In pursuance of this design, Klapka left the ministry of war, and assumed command of the fortress and troops in and about Comorn. Besides several lesser combats, in which he was the winning party, he gained an important

victory on the 13th of June near Comorn, when the enemy left some hundreds of dead upon the field—Gen. Wyss among the number.\* The army from Ofen at last joined him on the 10th of the month, followed a few days later by Görgey himself, who had reposed long enough upon his laurels. This latter general at first transferred his head-quarters to Gran, and afterwards to Todis, whence, through his bureau of operations, after the style of the earlier military council of the Austrian court, he ordered the disposition of the troops at arm's length as follows:—The first corps was sent to Mocsonok and Ürmény, the third to Nyitra, and the second to Ersekujvár; the seventh and eighth remained in their old positions at Comorn and Raab. The defence of the mountain cities and the mint was committed, God knows why, to his brother Cornelius.

All was now ready for action against the enemy, which

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\* I must not here omit all mention of a fact quite remarkable in the history of wars, or of princes, that happened on this occasion. A heroic German prince was dragged, by the heels, out of an oven, whither he had retired from pure courage. Our hussars were much delighted with this little victory over the hostile foot.

was to be commenced between the Waag and the Newhäuſler-Danube. A bridge was thrown over the stream at Aszod, and two brigades of the second *corps d'armée*, under Colonel Asboth, sent thither to reconnoitre\* just at the time when the first corps had made an unsuccessful assault upon Szered from Sempte, and lost four cannons. Colonel Asboth was equally unfortunate in his expedition. One of his best battalions was nearly destroyed in storming a hostile intrenchment. On the 20th of June, four days afterwards, when the reconnoitering had given the enemy sufficient warning to concentrate all their forces between the Waag and the Newhäuſler-Danube, the second and third corps entered this *cul de sac*, and attacked them at Királyrév, while Klapka, with a part of the eighth corps, endeavored to take Nyárasd, so as to get command if possible of the passage over the Little Danube at Vásárut, and cut off their retreat into the Schütt. But they were in large numbers at Nyárasd and its neighborhood, and, by several vigorous charges of their Uhlans and cuirassiers, proved

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\* This was one of the most senseless dispositions, for, instead of misleading the enemy, and concealing the true point of attack, it only served to turn their attention directly upon it.

themselves an overmatch for the hussars of Károlyi, Lehel, and Hunyadi, who saw fire for the first time that day, and retreated, leaving their cannons behind. Görgey had better success, for he drove more than three times his own numbers behind Pered, and gained advantages that made good more than fourfold what Klapka had lost. The fight was renewed next morning, with increased violence, at Pered. Although the enemy had been joined, in the course of the night, by an important reinforcement of Russian troops, they were at first repulsed ; but, by their enormous superiority in numbers, they turned our flank, assailed the rear, and forced us to retire.\* The retreat was conducted in the greatest order, although we were cut off from the bridge, and the enemy had occupied Zsigárd and Királyrév, two places through which our course lay, and which had to be carried by storm. The battle lasted till evening. When our men began to cross the bridge, the corps at Nyárasd, with which Klapka engaged the preceding day, advanced to Aszod, for the purpose of destroying it, but was this time vigorously repulsed by him. The united

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\* We were 22,000 against 95,000 combined Austrians and Russians, under their new commander-in-chief, Haynau.



loss of these two days, on both sides, was nearly 5,000, in killed and wounded. In the courtyard of a farm-house, that had been defended and carried by assault, I counted the dead bodies of 127 Austrian grenadiers. Immediately after this battle, the enemy, as might have been foreseen, transferred all their disposable force to the right bank of the Danube, in order to begin their offensive operations there. On the 27th of the month Raab was attacked by 40,000 men. The garrison, only 6,000 strong,\* held their position bravely from eight in the morning till three in the afternoon, when, without any considerable loss, they retreated to Comorn.

The Austrian army—of which, meantime, the Emperor himself, encouraged by the results of the action at Pered, had taken command—soon followed. On the 2d of July, with a force of 40,000, we gained a victory over 70,000 Austrians and 25,000 Russians, which, had we but lost,

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\* The division of Kmety, numbering 5,000, properly belonged to this garrison, but were cut off from the place by the enemy's sudden passage of the river Raab. They afterwards formed a junction with the army of the south, and never reunited with their former corps.

Hungary might be this day an independent nation. Early in the morning the intrenched camp before Comorn, whither the entire Hungarian army had retired, was assaulted on all sides. The Austrians turned their main strength, however, against the heights of Monostor, a position that commanded the entire Palatinal line, and from which the garrison itself could be annoyed by heavy ordnance. They carried the first four lines at the first charge. They then took the village of Oszöny, into which we had neglected to throw troops, without difficulty. The centre manœuvred on the right and left, but kept at a pretty distance, fearing the open jaws of the black eighteen-pounders that coquetted with them. Matters stood in this condition when the general staff appeared in the camp. Görgey took command of the right wing, committed that of the centre to Klapka, and of the left to Gen. Leiningen. The combat grew more violent as soon as these officers took their respective posts. Leiningen too soon prepared an unsuccessful cavalry charge, which cost us our bravest horse-battery.\* The battle continued with various success till

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\* This battery accompanied the cavalry to the attack, and, when the latter were suddenly repulsed, the battery also re-

long past noon, when one of Görgey's adjutants came to the centre, with orders to Gen. Klapka to send help if possible to Gen. Leiningen, and to take Oszöny at any price, for he, Görgey, had already forced the enemy from the lines on the heights, and driven their right wing back to the wood of Acs. Klapka faithfully obeyed the order, and, in less than an hour, our troops, after two repulses, held Oszöny in his possession. The flying enemy were pursued in the direction of Todis. Görgey now came to the centre, took all the cavalry and six batteries, and charged upon the hostile centre, which he immediately broke and pursued till nightfall.\*

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treated at full speed, but, unhappily, in the direction of a ditch, which was not seen until it was too late to rein in, and one cannon after another pitched into it. The place was covered by a range of hills, and none of the enemy, except those engaged in the immediate pursuit, were witnesses of our disaster. The cannoneers would not leave these war jewels committed to their care. On returning to the spot after the victory, we found all but three of them in one heap of dead; about the same number of cuirassiers, lying near by, had attended them to their long rest. The enemy had carried off the guns.

\* His royal imperial Austrian majesty lost his title of the

The day was ours. The grand Austrian army, under the eyes of their Emperor, was obliged to yield before our troops—the juvenile monarch, who, in his nineteenth year, had already become great in murdering, with his raven mother, must needs take to his heels. We took twice as many cannons as we lost. Besides the many prisoners in our hands, the enemy left several thousand dead on the field. We also had to mourn 2,000 comrades, dead and wounded—among the latter Gen. Görgey, who was grazed on the head by a grape-shot.

When we were returning to the city at a late hour in the evening with Klapka, after setting the necessary guards, we were met by a staff-officer, who handed to the general an important message from the government. Its purport was to the effect that Görgey, who had refused, at the frequent and pressing request of government, to unite

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chevalier, for, with his Frau mama, who accompanied in male attire, he rode at the top of his speed to Raab, but was thrown from his horse several times on the way. He also lost all desire to remain longer commander-in-chief, and resigned his post the same day.

with Dembinsky, but persisted in uselessly remaining about Comorn, while the capital of the country, the seat of the government, and the Diet was abandoned to the enemy, should be removed from the chief command, and his place filled by Mészáros. Official letters of the same tenor were sent with this document for the commanders of the several corps, which Klapka was desired to deliver.

The commanders of all the corps were assembled in the evening at Klapka's quarters. It was then concluded to say nothing to Gen. Görgey, but call a grand council of war the next day, at which this serious question should be discussed. The council met. At first there reigned a deep silence, which was soon followed by the passionate cry, "No, no! Görgey must remain. We cannot now serve under Mészáros!" There was just at this time a most unfortunate conjunction of circumstances that afterwards brought our ruin in their train.

First,—Görgey had but the day before gained a brilliant victory over twice his own numbers, commanded by the Emperor himself.

Secondly,—This victory was to be ascribed almost entirely to his bravery; for he had conducted in person the charge upon the lines that the enemy had already taken.

He led in person the great column of cavalry that broke the enemy's centre.

Thirdly,—The hero had been wounded on the day of victory.

Fourthly,—Gen. Mészáros, a most honest patriot, a very brave but very unfortunate soldier, had said, as we were told by the messenger, on hearing the cannonade before Comorn, as the steamboat came to Almás, "that he would not be taken to please any one," and handing the letters to the staff-officer, forthwith ordered the vessel to turn about. These combined circumstances operated so powerfully, that it was resolved to serve only under Görgey, and to send him a vote of confidence, which was accordingly presented the same day. So was the grave dug for our country. If Kossuth had come himself,—had some other than Mészáros been appointed to the chief command,—had the unlucky order arrived one day sooner, Görgey's fall had been certain, and ours might now be one among the nations of the earth.

From this time onward Görgey paid no further attention to the government, which still called him several times to the protection of Pesth. He no longer considered himself appointed by the government, but chosen by the officers.

None could doubt the reality of his patriotism, for by the execution of Count Zichy, he had at the very outset taken his stand on revolutionary ground. We believed that these little differences with the government would all be settled by one great victory. We were bitterly deceived.

Before he recovered from his wound, Görgey had devised a plan for breaking through the Austrian army, then to move towards Croatia, make requisitions of arms there, raise the siege of Peterwardein, and either unite with the army of the south or with the main army of Dembinsky, if that had been forced so far down. The first part of this plan was to be executed by Klapka. At eight in the morning of the 11th of July, the troops were drawn up in the camp. At nine, the 8th corps began their march upon the wood of Acs, the 7th upon Puszta-Herkály, the 3d upon Csém, and the 1st upon Mocsá. The fighting, too, soon commenced at all points, and raged without intermission till three in the afternoon, without apparent advantage on either side. At last the left, and immediately afterwards the right of our opponents gave way, and the artillery of the centre drew back, when the Russian division Paniutin flanked our 3d corps, which was just ready to storm Csém, and by a well-directed fire obliged it to retire. Hereupon

Klapka, perhaps mainly because he had not fully agreed with Görgey in regard to this plan, ordered the two wings, which were well advanced, to retreat.

The enemy followed us at a respectful distance to our camp, which we reached at nightfall. Taking into view the large amount of artillery employed in this long engagement, the loss was not great, numbering on both sides 2,000 men. The Austrian troops who fought on the 2d of the month took part in this action ; we were some 5 or 6,000 stronger than them. When Görgey saw his design fail in its inception, he abandoned it, and on the 13th of July marched from Comorn down the right bank of the Danube towards Pesh.



## V.

THE NUMBERS AND SITUATIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE TIME  
OF THE AUSTRO-RUSSIAN INVASION, AFTER THE DEPARTURE  
OF GÖRGEY FROM COMORN.

Of hostile troops:—There were under Haynau on their

march to the Theiss - - - - - 90,000

Paskiewics brought 140,000, which were divided as fol-

lows:—Under his own command, between Kaschau  
and Pesth, there were - - - - - 75,000

In Haynau's army - - - - - 25,000

Under Rüdigers and Lüders in Transylvania - - 40,000 140,000

The Austrian army of the south, under Jellachich, on

the Lower Danube - - - - - 50,000

The garrison of Karlsburg - - - - - 6,000

Under Clam in Transylvania - - - - - 14,000

Under Rukovina in Temesvar - - - - - 8,000

The Raitzes, in the Banat and Bácska, under Rajacsics

and Stratimirovics - - - - - 40,000

The Wallachians in Transylvania, and on the eastern bor-

ders of Hungary, under Jank - - - - - 30,000

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Total 378,000

On the part of the Hungarians:—Klapka had 20,000 men in Comorn and in the intrenched camp before the city; to these are to be added 7,000 recruits, assembled on occasion of the last attack made upon the besieging forces	27,000
There were under Colonel Paul Kiss in Peterwardein	5,000
Colonel Kazinczy in Munkács and its neighborhood	8,000
Damjanics in Arad	4,000
The blockading army at Kalsburg, in Transylvania, under General Stein	5,000
The blockading army before Temesvár, under General Count Vécsey	7,000
Under Görgey, on their march behind the Theiss	26,000
Under Dembinsky, originally posted from Káta to Szolnok	30,000
Under Bem in Transylvania	20,000
Under Vetter, in position from Neusatz to Futak	25,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>157,000</b>

It must be observed of this number of our forces, that not more than one-third had fire-arms; the rest were furnished only with pikes or scythes.

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE CLOSING OPERATIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN ARMIES, AND OF THE RESPECTIVE DISSOLUTION OF EACH IN THE ORDER IN WHICH IT TOOK PLACE.

The fate of the different garrisons has already been told, and I therefore directly proceed to relate that of the various armies. Let the intelligent reader decide in conclusion whether we have been conquered by the Czar and his vassals, or have rather fallen a sacrifice to ambition, pride, and finally to treachery.

#### THE HUNGARIAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH UNDER VETTER.

This army, composed for the most part of the youngest troops, fought in the months of March and April under Perczel, against the insurgent Raitzes. In the taking of Gözpodince, Pancsova, and especially St. Tomás, they gave abundant proof that they were not inferior to older soldiers in zeal and bravery. Owing to the frequent collisions of Perczel with the officers, he had to be removed, and the command of this force was given to General Vet-

ter, who, in the month of July, defeated the Austrian southern army under Jellachich, near Szegedin, almost annihilated his cavalry, and drove back his remaining troops at first to Tittel, then to Ruma in Slavonia, and finally to Mitrovicz in the military frontiers.

This battle with Jellachich was one of the bloodiest of the whole war. He left seven thousand dead on the field. Ten cannons and several thousand prisoners fell into our hands. Our loss was two hundred and forty killed and wounded.

The inventive Jellachich devised an excuse also for this failure, to satisfy his sweet mistress, the Archduchess Sophia. An honest old captain\* was charged with having betrayed his plan of operations, and hung—by virtue of

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\* After the battle of Tápiobicske and Isaszeg, a dispatch from Jellachich to the court was intercepted, in which he excused his retreat on the score of the unhealthiness of the region, which made it necessary to withdraw his men. It was the universal opinion that the poor victim, in the present instance, had never been in a condition that would enable him to betray the senseless plans of his general.

poetic license. The good understanding between the Ban and his mistress was thereupon restored.

Shortly after this battle the army was joined by the division of Kmety, which was cut off from the seventh *corps d'armée*, by the occupation of Raab in June. Thus increased, they soon received orders from Dembinsky to unite with the main army, that had meantime marched quite down to Szegedin. They proceeded thither, but under General Guyon's conduct. Vetter had disappeared. I myself asked hundreds of those who afterwards reached Comorn from the lower army, what had become of him. Every man lamented him, many a tear started at mention of his name, but none could tell, though all suspected, what had been his end. The Camarilla has sent few abler men to a better world.\*

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\* It is proper for me here to remark, that my statement that "the Austrian Camarilla holds no means too wicked or too base," rests upon facts. For example—On the 2d of September an assassin was sent to Romow, to hasten Gen. Klapka's passage to eternity. He was fortunately detected when on the point of executing the accursed deed, and was shot the same day. Before his execution he disclosed the fact that there was another hind

## THE ARMY IN TRANSYLVANIA UNDER BEM.

Just at the time when the Hungarian government was developing its whole force and energies to present a firm resistance to the Austrian invasion, and to suppress the insurrection of the Raitzes and Serbs which had broken out into fearful excesses in the south, new difficulties arose. The military command, and the Saxons and Wallachians of Transylvania, took their stand in opposition to the Hungarian ministry; the small number of Hungarian troops stationed there were driven out of the land by a superior force, and that whole country, with the exception of the small district of the Szeklers, who had but too soon to humble themselves, lost to Hungary. It was determined, however, not to give it up till the utmost efforts had been made for its recovery. The expelled troops, numbering between five and six thousand, were re-assembled. The

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for the same purpose, who would shortly make his appearance in the uniform of a hussar of Görgey's army. Klapka escaped, for he was on his guard. Would that poor Vetter could also have been warned!

command of these was conferred upon Gen. Bem, ~~who~~<sup>who</sup> had fled from Vienna, and was now healed of the wound ~~he~~<sup>he</sup> had received there from a fellow-countryman.

Bem soon restored this army, which was much demoralized, to a condition that would inspire respect; and at the end of three weeks had made it ready to begin offensive operations upon Transylvania, where there were at that time opposed to him from thirty to forty thousand Wallachians, and fourteen thousand Austrian regulars. In spite of this great superiority of opposing numbers, he very soon took the chief city. Partly by slight engagements, partly by the moral influence of his name, which was everywhere felt, and partly by his kind treatment of the people, he almost wholly suppressed the Wallachian insurrection. By means of several victorious actions, he also restored the communication with the Szeklers, who dwell quite in a different part of the country. With his force increased by recruits from this people and others to the number of 20,000, Bem marched at first against General Gedeon, who stood with six thousand Austrians and those Wallachians who were not yet pacified, about Besztercze. This last named general, after suffering various losses, was driven out of Transylvania by the Burgo pass

into Bukowina, and entirely cut off from the main body of the army.

Puchner, who was in the Saxon district with eight thousand men, and who had undoubtedly received powers from the Austro-Russian government to this end, now called for aid upon the Russian general, Lüders, who was stationed in Wallachia. For the sake of appearances, however, he made the request ostensibly on his own responsibility. Lüders immediately dispatched ten thousand men under General Scariat to his assistance. Nothing daunted by this circumstance, our Bem pushed forward, and after having beaten the combined Austro-Russian forces five several times, carried Hermanstadt by storm, and soon after Kronstadt, the two main supports of the reaction. In an incredibly brief period, he drove the army itself through the Temeser pass into Wallachia. With the exception of the garrison of Klausenburg, and a few thousands of Wallachians who had retired to the mountains in small divisions under the conduct of the partisan Jank, Transylvania was now entirely cleared of enemies, and held by an army twenty thousand strong, accustomed to victory and commanded by one of the ablest generals of the present day,



But, alas! this army was not able to contend successfully with the forty thousand Russians, the fourteen thousand Austrians, who approached on three different sides in the month of June, and the new insurrection of thirty thousand well-armed Wallachians. It became demoralized by the influence of Austrian and Russian gold, to which many of the Szeklers, our best soldiers, yielded, so that Bem lost four successive battles, together with his war materiel. The army which but a short time previous had been the terror of Russians and Austrians, was utterly dispersed before the breaking up of that of Dembinsky.

After this unfortunate issue of the campaign, Bem, attended only by his adjutant, hastened to Hungary, to undertake the charge of new posts there committed to him by the government.

## VI.

## THE HUNGARIAN MAIN ARMY UNDER DEMBINSKY.

THIS body was composed of troops newly raised in the months of April and May, 1849, and of the Polish legion, for the purpose of guarding against a new invasion from Galicia.\* It numbered, in the beginning, 12,000, and was commanded by Dembinsky, who, however, resigned at the end of May, because the government would not approve his plan of an irruption into Galicia. His successor, Gen. Wisocky, was not long able to hold out against

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\* The number of Poles who took part in our revolution is very generally estimated too high. I am the more desirous to correct this error, because many individuals, and even the Austrian and Russian governments themselves, excuse the Russian intervention on the ground that our struggle for independence was a Magyar-Polish revolution. The truth is, that there were at the most not more than between two and three thousand Poles in our service. They were divided as follows:

the Russians, and by the end of June was obliged to give up his position, and, constantly harassed by the Cossacks, to move down towards Pesth, in order if possible to protect the capital. On reaching Szolnok, he was joined by Perczel's reserve of 14,000 men, and, after the evacuation of Pesth in the middle of July, by the troops who had been in that city, to the number of 4,000.

Notwithstanding the want of confidence generally expressed by the corps of officers, during the campaign of the previous winter, Kossuth still rested his boldest hopes on Dembinsky, and committed the unpardonable error of restoring the chief command of this army, now 30,000 strong,

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Infantry under Wisocky	- - - - -	800
The same under Bulharym	- - - - -	400
Artillery under Major Rembowaky	- - - - -	120
Jägers under Prince Woroneczky	- - - - -	300
Four squadrons of Uhlans under Thornitzky	- - - - -	600
Scattered through the armies, at the largest estimate		300

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2,520

To these may be added such prisoners from the Austrian regiments as voluntarily took service in the Polish legion in preference to remaining prisoners of war.

to that general. After having fought two unimportant battles with the Russians, in the neighborhood of Szolnok, on hearing that Görgey was retreating on the mountain road, he marched down behind the Theiss to Szegedin, where, meanwhile, the government and Diet had established themselves.\* The army was here further increased by 10,000 troops hastily raised; the entire army of the South, numbering 25,000, as already mentioned, was there incorporated with it. In a week the city itself was transformed, by the labors of 100,000 hands, into a strong, tenable position. But, notwithstanding the fortifications, and although his front was covered by the Theiss, his right by the Marosch, his left flank guarded by Peterwardein, and his rear by the army, which he must have supposed in good condition, in Transylvania, as well as by the blockading forces of Temesvár, and although he had between 60 and 70,000 men at his disposal, Dembinsky declared himself

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\* During the two successive days when Görgey was fighting near Waitzen, Dembinsky was at Kolta and could easily have sent or been called upon for assistance. The dissensions and jealousies of these two leaders prevented either from asking or giving.

unable to hold his ground when Haynau approached, *and*, after a short engagement with artillery, gave up not *only* his immediate position, but the whole line of the Theiss *and* the Marosch. The large supplies of provisions and *munitions* of war in the city, which the government, occupied in providing for its own safety, could take no speedy measures for securing, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Haynau made immediate use of the advantages that had been thrown into his hands, threw a bridge over the river at Szegedin, and pursued Dembinsky in all haste. A decisive battle was fought between the two parties before Temesvár. At first it inclined in our favor, the enemy were repulsed and driven in hot pursuit almost to Great Beeskerek. But, meanwhile, our ammunition was all spent, so that when the Austrian cavalry under General Prince Lichtenstein, who had come around upon Dembinsky's left flank, appeared on the field, and the discharge of artillery began, no fire could be returned from the Hungarian side. Our army was now repulsed in turn and closely pursued, falling into such utter confusion, in the course of the rapid retreat, that order could not possibly be again restored.

Owing to the loss of this battle, the siege of Temesvár, which fortress could have held out but two or three days

longer, had to be raised. The besieging force was quite too small to risk a battle with the Austrian army that was approaching to the relief of the garrison. Dembinsky's troops, who might have rallied at this place, fled by on the right and left. The smaller party went towards Orsova, and afterwards reached Turkey. The larger number proceeded to Lugos. Here they soon learned of the treachery of Görgey, the resignation of Kossuth, and the dissolution of the Diet and ministry. Taking no further care of the bank-note press, the supplies of clothing and munitions of war, and the whole artillery, they dispersed entirely, each individual choosing what seemed to him his safest course. A few small bodies remained united under Guyon and Kmety.

When Bem, who had been called by Kossuth to take command of the two armies of Görgey and Dembinsky, arrived at Lugos, he found only the little divisions just mentioned in order. But their noble commanders declared that even these could not be relied upon, being totally demoralized by the treachery of Görgey.

Besides the hasty desertion of Szegedin, which bore the air almost of treason, and by which, in addition to all other disadvantages, the taking of Temesvár was frustrated, and

the criminal neglect to care for the ammunition, there are still stronger grounds for suspecting Dembinsky either of extreme stupidity or of bad intentions. They lie in the circumstance that, instead of proceeding, as he had been distinctly ordered to do, towards Arad, which was in our hands, he retreated from Szegedin directly towards Temesvár, and so destroyed the possibility of a union of the two armies, which otherwise might, perhaps, have taken place, in spite of Görgey's intentions.

## VII.

THE ARMY OF GÖRGEY, AND THE CORPS D'ARMÉE OF STEIN,  
COUNT VECSEY, AND KAZINCZY.

WHEN Görgey, after the battle of the 11th of July, became sufficiently convinced that the attempt, which he had designed simply for the sake of not uniting with Dembinsky, to break through the Austrian army on the right bank of the Danube could not be executed, he marched from Comorn down the left bank on the 13th of the same month. His army numbered 26,000 men, divided into three *corps d'armée*, under Generals Nagy-Sándor, Count Leiningen, and Pöltenberg. They were the choicest troops of Hungary, the heroes of Szolnok, Tápiobicske, Isaszeg, Nagy-Sarlo, Comorn, and Ofen; they were provided with seven regiments of hussars, mostly veterans, and with 149 cannon excellently served. The resolution, bravery, and perseverance of these troops were so distinguished, that an issue in their favor might be confidently looked for in an encounter with three times their number.



The third corps, which, in thirty actions, had never once been defeated, was alone equal to a contest with all the Austrian armies. Görgey had therefore only to keep in the lawful path of his duty, and maintain this glorious spirit in his troops ; so he might have stood invincible against the Colossus of the North. But a rumor was spread through the army by his creatures, acting under his orders, that they were not strong enough to hold out against the Russians. This circumstance, and the fact, which at last became generally known, that the general had refused obedience to his legitimate government, undermined by degrees the sound principles of this admirable army, and the demoralization now increased with astonishing rapidity.

On the 15th of July, Görgey, with two corps, arrived before Waitzen, which was held by the Russian division of Kru-low. After the first attack, the Russians left the town, and marched out to the heights lying towards Pesth. The fight was there prolonged till evening, with no especial advantages on our side, except that the hostile centre and right wing were forced to yield some ground, and lost a part of their supplies of ammunition. On the 16th there was merely an engagement with artillery, without the least

advantage to us. At evening Görgey issued orders to begin the march during the night on the mountain road, in order to reach the line of the Theiss. In pursuance of these orders the troops moved at midnight in perfect silence; but the great number of baggage-wagons hindered the march so much, that at four in the morning the rear-guard with many wagons, was still in Waitzen. The Russians observed the retreat of the main army, made an attack at the hour just mentioned, dispersed several divisions of the rear-guard, and seized all the baggage of the two corps, together with some dismounted cannons. When Görgey heard of this he sent back several divisions to the assistance of the rear, who, at six o'clock, again expelled the Russians from the town, where they were beginning to commit fearful excesses.\* He then continued his course towards the

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\* To give the public of this country some idea of the character of these Russians, I must introduce here an occurrence that took place on this occasion. The citizens had taken a very active part in the first expulsion of the Russians. When therefore the latter re-entered the city, they immediately began to plunder and destroy. Count Zichy, a canon of the cathedral at Waitzen, when he heard of their proceedings, put on his robes and his

mountains, past Rétság, Balassa-Gyarmath, Losoncz, Rima-Szombath, Rima-Szécs, Putnok, Zsolcza, Szerencs, and by Tokay over the Theiss. He was closely followed by the Russians, and had a skirmish with their Cossacks at almost every station. The first visible negotiator between them and himself appeared at Rima-Szombath in the person of a nephew of Gen. Rüdiger, who brought him a present of Russian arms, and at the same time desired to conclude an armistice of twenty-four hours. Görgey accepted the gift, and returned the courtesy with some articles of his own arms. He could not, however, at this time have decided on his treasonable course, for he refused to assent to the pro-

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golden cross, for the sake of imposing upon their superstitious natures. A large company of the invaders, with an officer among them, soon presented themselves at the canon's door. As they were rushing in, he met them with gravity and distributed his blessing, after the Catholic manner, in lavish abundance upon the unbidden guests. At first they were astounded, and then sank upon their knees. At the close of the ceremony they arose, respectfully kissed the priestly hands, and then—commenced their plundering, with which they were so thorough, that they did not leave the canon a change of linen.

posed armistice, which had no other object than to give an advance of twenty-four hours to the main body of the Russians, who were moving upon the direct road from Pesth to Miskolcz, so that they might the more certainly shut him up in the mountain-pass.

But this vacillation in Görgey's treasonable purposes was of short duration. At the next station he removed the chief of his general-staff, and substituted his own brother, Lieutenant-colonel Armin Görgey, that he might the better work in secret. He intentionally and rapidly weakened the physical and moral soundness of his forces by extraordinary marches, by frequent parleys with the enemy, by discouraging reports, and by all kinds of deprivations. All discipline was soon destroyed. Hundreds were left to die on the road; other hundreds were allowed to desert. The demoralization had gone so far, that at Putnok he ventured to speak openly and with impunity of a surrender to the Russians. At Zsolcza the troops became fully aware of his designs; for while they were exposed to the enemy's fire through the day, he stayed in the village playing at makao with some of his creatures. When an adjutant came dashing in to ask for further commands, he was coolly answered that "the dispositions were already made."

Just at this time an aunt of Görgey was apprehended at Szikszó, where the first *corps d'armée* then was, who was carrying letters from him to Field-marshal Paskiewicz, of a tenor that left no further doubt as to his purpose of surrender. General Nagy-Sándor sent these letters by special carriers in all haste to the government, and added a full account of the whole state of affairs. Thereupon Kossuth appointed a meeting for conference with Görgey at Czibakháza. The latter did not accept the invitation, but marched from Tokay in two columns—with the first corps towards Debreczin, with the third and seventh to Vámospercz and Gross-Wardein.

The first corps was attacked about noon at Debreczin by the main Russian army and defeated.\* The action lasted

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\* The Hungarian commander was that General Nagy-Sándor, who declared in a council of war at Comorn, when Görgey would not obey the orders of the government, "that whoever aimed at a military dictatorship, would find in him a Brutus." This saying, and the fact that the first corps were mostly warm patriots and least fitted to his criminal purposes, made Görgey so hostile to these brave troops, that he desired to bring about their entire destruction. And he nearly succeeded in effecting it. From

till evening. Meanwhile Görgey was at Vámospercz with the other two corps, at the furthest a distance of not more than two hours march from the field of battle, but did not come to the assistance of the first corps, who owed their escape from total destruction only to the darkness.\*

Not remaining at Gross-Wardein, where he added some new troops to his army, Görgey proceeded to Arad. From here he made, *pro forma*, a reconnoissance towards Temesvár—but only *pro forma*! Instead of destroying the Austrian army in the neighborhood of Vinga, which he could have easily done, he contented himself with firing a few

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being exposed to almost all the assaults attendant upon the retreat, and being left to fight unaided at Debreczin, they were so reduced, that of the 9,600 men who marched from Comorn but 4,000 reached Gross-Wardein.

\* Görgey was well aware that Nagy-Sándor would be attacked that day. He said to his staff the preceding evening: "To-morrow Nagy-Sándor will get a dressing." And yet he took no measures to protect him from this "dressing." Such expressions were afterwards told by his inferior tools when they found that they also were betrayed. "Wicks," the expression used by Görgey, and here translated *dressing*, is a low word used by the vulgar instead of "schläge," *blows*.—Tr.

cannon, and then without the least necessity, even leaving Ujarad to the enemy, crossed the Maros and returned to Old Arad. Soon after this, Kossuth, who measured others by the standard of his own honor, and in spite of what had happened still doubted Görgey's villainy, attributing the steps he had taken simply to his ambition and fondness for the highest dignity, resigned in his favor the dictatorship conferred upon himself by twelve millions of his countrymen. His hope was to satisfy Görgey's ambition, and thus save the country. How dreadful was the error! By this act, Arad, an eminently patriotic city, whose spirited inhabitants had never swerved from their faith while exposed for nearly a year to the storm of bombs and balls hurled among them from the hostile fortress in their midst, became, by the mockery of fate, the burial-place of Hungarian—perhaps of European freedom. In less than two months after Kossuth's resignation, thirteen of our generals, among the foremost champions of freedom, were murdered there by the butchers of Hapsburg.

When Görgey finally gained possession of the high office he had so long desired to hold, he must have been thoroughly entangled in the nets of the enemy; for even the attainment of his desire could no longer withhold him

from sacrificing his country. He now rapidly approached the consummation of his treason. By means of his subservient tools he busily spread abroad the idea that he could not possibly hold out any longer, and that the Duke of Leuchtenberg, who had fully guaranteed the constitution of 1848, would be placed, by the help of the Russians, on the Hungarian throne. He dispatched orders to all the armies and garrisons to yield to the Russians on the same conditions as those which he accepted for himself. He then left Arad and manœuvered hither and thither until the 13th of August, when he surrendered to the Russians, whom he had daily apprized of his movements, that they might inclose his army, of which, in spite of its corrupted condition, he stood in fear.

He had, on the 11th of the month, at Világos, obtained a promise from all the commanders under him to act with him, on a pretense that they should unite with the Russians against Austria. The actual surrender took place at Boros Jenő close by Világos.\*

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\* The following account of Görgey's surrender is here inserted, not only for its interest as a story of the catastrophe of the revolution, but because it corroborates some statements in the text



The remnants of Stein's corps—he himself made good his escape to Turkey—and the corps of Gen. Count Vécsey and

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regarding the kind treatment our men received at the hands of the Russians. The witness in the case is an Austrian officer, who furnished the facts to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. The translation below first appeared in the *New York Tribune*.

“The hot sun of August 13th, shone with his piercing rays on the parched and silent ranks of the insurgents, whose army was drawn up in two solid columns, on each side of the Szöllös road. Groups of officers stood before their battalions, gloomily talking with each other. Staff-officers in their splendid uniforms rode up and down, occasionally speaking a word of encouragement to the faint-hearted; for the usual noisy gayety so peculiar to the Magyars had given place to the most painful depression. ‘Must it be carried so far with us?’ was the despairing cry that arose on every side. Curses, such as no one can command but a Magyar in trouble, resounded from the closed ranks. Wherever the eye turned, there was lamentation and despair. It seemed like a vast field of death.

“Here were seen the wild features of the ‘Prince of Prussia’ regiment, soldiers alike fearless in war and reckless in peace, the consolidated battalions called ‘Alexander,’ ‘Schwarzenberg,’ ‘Franz Carl,’ ‘Don Miguel,’ ‘Vasa.’ Few of those who

of Col. Kazinczy quickly followed Görgey's example. These commanders received the report of co-operation with the

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had broken their oath to their Emperor were present to see the victory of the avenging double-headed Eagle. On the bloody battle-fields of Hungary, on the shores of the Danube and the Waag, most of them had found their graves. As the flower of Görgey's army, they were chosen to meet the first shock, and to fight the hardest battle in all cases. Here, as in every hotly-contested battle, the two rivals in bravery, the 'bosom children' of Damjanics and Földvág, the third and ninth Honvéd battalions, stood close together. These, the so-called 'Redcaps,' formed the *élite* of the Honvéds. They understood only one command—'Előre,' forward, and their wild battle-cry, 'Eljen a Magyar,' which they cheerily sounded forth in the thick gunpowder smoke, often produced panic and confusion. 'Third and ninth battalion **Előre!**'—this cry was heard where the deeds of the most terrific danger were to be performed; a third part, perhaps one-half, fell; but the point was carried.

"The hussars, leaning on their jaded, skeleton-looking horses, seemed to exchange with them one last mute word, and to bid them a final farewell. 'I must leave you and go on foot like a dog,' they murmured in the ear of their trusty companions. The greater part regarded this as a misfortune to break their hearts.

Russians, and the express order of Görgey to yield on the same conditions as had been granted to himself, with such

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They would prefer exposing themselves to the greatest dangers. They cast off their laced dolmans in which they took such pride, and bursting through the military shell, tore the saddles from their horses, and rushed off at full gallop, in order to become again what they were before, 'the wild Csikós (horse-tamer) of the boundless Puszta. Here was the brave regiment of the Ferdinand Hussars, with the old war-wolf their Colonel at their head. It was he who at the council of war at Világos most strenuously opposed the surrender. When he was outvoted, in his rage he threw his heavy sabre rattling at the feet of Görgey, so that the hall resounded with the noise. Within the gloomy walls of Arad he may well expect in sadness the fearful fate which he anticipated.

"At a little on one side of the main road, a stone bridge leads over a small mountain-stream, which falling on the wheels of the neighboring mill, loses itself in the surrounding meadows. The large yard of this mill was at this moment crowded full with all sorts of vehicles.

"There stood in promiscuous confusion the splendid four-horse chariot of the minister, and the worn-out, one-horse market-cart; the large, heavy baggage-wagon, with the light private

blind heedless belief, that they even marched to meet the enemy, and lay down their arms before them, without once

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carriage of the officers in endless variety. From the tops which protected against the sun, looked out with eager curiosity, the fiery eyes of the fair occupants. In spite of the strict regulations, threats, and even punishments, an innumerable crowd of women of every description followed the Magyar army, contributing in no small degree to the demoralization of the soldiers. As soon as it came to a retreat, what confusion did they not occasion? Then was there a panic, a shrieking, a flying about, as if the enemy had nothing to think of but their beautiful persons. Bem suffered so much from this grievance in Transylvania, that he would often cry out in comic despair, 'I have indeed commanded a larger army, but never so many women.'

"After I had wound my way along, with a great deal of trouble, I reached a small straw-roofed building, the only inn in the place.

"As soon as I entered I saw the Chief Commandant and Görgey, the Hungarian Dictator for the last 48 hours. He was dressed in his simple but romantic costume, which differed very much from that of the general-staff who stood round him. In a light-brown blouse, with a golden collar, riding-boots reaching far above the knee, a round black hat surmounted with a waving

inquiring into the nature of the pretended conditions of surrender. Avenging Nemesis punished their incautious haste.

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white feather, he was joking with a pretty young girl, into whose ear he whispered flattering nonsense. I was astonished: a few minutes before the catastrophe effected by him which decided the fate of Hungary, surrounded by men whose dark visages wore the impression of the deepest despair, could this man, serenely smiling, be exchanging gallantries with a frivolous girl! Was this a forced cheerfulness, or the repose of a pure conscience? Who can decide?

"The general-staff floated around him, their splendor and magnificence recalling the times of Hunyady and Zriny. Every one was dressed in his most elegant uniform as if for a festival. The sun-burnt, youthful, thin figures in short *Attilas* with heavy gold trimmings, hats with waving feathers on their heads, mounted on fiery horses, galloping to and fro, formed a group as warlike as the fancy of a painter could describe.

"In the midst of this a general commotion took place. Görgey had thrown himself on his horse, and after him his whole glittering suite. It was the last act which was to conclude the grand drama of the Magyar war. The splendid cavalcade had placed itself in motion; the bridge, unaccustomed to such a burden, groaned under the hoofs of the proudly-prancing horses, while

Vécsey, although his father had saved the life of the Emperor Francis, in the French campaign, and was at that

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the eye followed the historical procession with astonishment and dismay.

“When Görgey, after the transactions were closed at Világos, went into the ~~midst~~ of the army and declared, ‘that he no longer felt it in his power to defend the army, but if any was found willing to assume the command he would gladly yield it to him,’ there was but one man ready for the proposal. This was a gray-haired captain of the Hussars, who sprang forward, and, the tears which he never knew before falling on his grizzled beard, cried out, ‘It was his wish and that of his comrades to cut their way through, and this must be the feeling of the whole army.’ Görgey spoke to him privately and drily remarked, ‘That it was no time to joke, and there were balls enough to crush any mutiny.’

“Only a soldier’s heart can comprehend the feeling with which a man is parted from his arms. Many seemed torn in pieces in helpless agony, others wept as they kissed the cold steel, while a great number shrieked out with rage to be led against the enemy, and not to be subjected to this disgrace. I saw how officers and men threw themselves into each other’s arms, and, sobbing, bid each other farewell. But in other places they raved against the

time an Austrian general of cavalry and captain of the noble body-guard, was hung like a felon; Kazinczy was shot.

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officers and accused them of selfishness. No pen can describe the woe, the despair, which prevailed among the Hussars. He, who felt so much at home on his horse, was now to be dismounted and creep along on foot like the meanest 'Baka.' Many shot their horses; and they who would have lost a limb without a groan, sobbed like children.

"During these scenes, Görgey rode round, proud and immovable as a marble statue of Mars, and it was only now and then that his ringing, metallic voice was heard exhorting them to make haste.

"Meanwhile, the twilight shadows began to fall on the broad fields, and heightened the gloom of the transaction. The poor victims of the war had thrown themselves on the grass, now wet with evening dew; near them were their arms piled in pyramids, the flag in the centre, as if it were the grisly skeleton of those battalions, whose ranks had shown so much courage and experienced so many sacrifices.

"But their rest was not of long duration. The Russian escort came galloping up, and, accompanied by them, the Magyars were obliged the same day to start one stage towards Zaránd. This

After these deplorable acts of surrender on all sides, which some troops endeavored to stand out against, but vainly—for they were, so to speak, hermetically closed in

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is the 'guard of honor,' I heard called out in their ranks. The march, under the Russian escort, from Szöllös to Sarkad lasted no less than eight days. Whoever during this time should have accidentally fallen upon the ruins of the Hungarian army, would have taken it for one of the motley caravans of the Arabian desert. The sun poured down his hottest rays on the sandy plains, over which moved an endless throng of carriages, horsemen, and foot-travelers, in the wildest confusion. Every moment the procession stopped, when all began to quarrel, curse, scream, and, for a change, to fisticuff each other. If the roads had been wider, or if the adjacent fields had afforded a tolerably convenient path, the maddest spectacle that can be imagined would have been exhibited. Every one who was not assigned to some special post was obliged to get on the best way he could, and, a general race commencing, there was no lack of petty miseries and comic scenes.

"I could not but be surprised at the imperturbable equanimity and quietness of the Russian escort. Nothing could extort from them a smile or the slightest emotion; they moved on in as cold and measured a manner as if they had been on a parade at their



by the Russians—Görgey remained at the head-quarters of Field-marshal Paskiewics, where he was treated with great honor, and received daily visits from the Duke himself. His officers had their side-arms restored to them, and so long as they were in the hands of the Russians, were honor-

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own wintry home. The flying Cossacks were an exception. They soon made friends with the few Hussars who were still on horseback, who made themselves very merry at their mode of riding, gave them good advice in regard to this, and took them under their fatherly care.

“During the eight days’ captivity, the Honvéd officers were treated as comrades and in the most friendly manner by the Russians. The higher officers eat at the same table, and small sums were paid out as traveling expenses. The effect of this was to inspire many with the highest hopes. But, as day after day passed, and they were neither summoned to enter into the Russian service, nor Prince Leuchtenberg or the High Prince Constantine was crowned as King of Hungary, by degrees, before the hard reality, burst the glittering soap-bubbles which floated before their imagination. In a few days the Magyar army was transported from Sarkad to Gyula, with the immense number of those compromised in the political movement, and there delivered over to the Imperial Austrian troops.”

ably dealt with. They were, however, soon turned over to the barbarous Austrians, and learned the bitter lesson how an ignoble and inhuman enemy treats, as prisoners of war, those from whom they always fled in the field.\* Men and officers were robbed of whatever they possessed. Their physical wants were unattended to. On the slightest provocation they were beaten. Finally, without regard to their previous rank, they were forced to enter the Austrian service as privates. The wealthy, on the most shameless pretexts, were either hung or shot, that the sunken state of Austrian finances might receive a temporary revival from the confiscation of their estates.†—But wait, House of

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\* At the end of May, 1849, we had two generals, fourteen hundred superior and staff officers, and thirty thousand privates, Austrians, prisoners of war. They were distributed in the various cities of the land, their personal liberty was allowed them, and the same pay that was given to the Hungarian army in time of peace. We have had sufficient experience at the close of our struggle of how Austria requited this magnanimity.

\* The inhuman conduct of Austria roused the indignation even of the Russians to such a degree, that they everywhere furnished all the aid in their power to our unhappy countrymen. They furnished them with food; they brought baggage-wagons full of

Hapsburg ! thou thyself hast taught us how to deal with thee. The hour may soon strike when thy accursed raven-brood, an insufficient sacrifice to the manes of the innocent men thou art now murdering, shall be cut off from the face of the earth which thou burdenest, the shame and abomination of thy kind.

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Hungarian officers from Arad; to those who were fortunate enough to escape, they pointed out the road by which they would avoid falling into the hands of the Austrians. One of my comrades now here, Major Fornet, was smuggled over the frontier by a Cossack officer.

## VIII.

COMORN AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE MAIN ARMY UNDER  
GÖRGEY.

AFTER the departure of the main army, besides the former garrison, consisting of ten nearly complete battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries, there remained in Comorn the entire second *corps d'armée*, under the command of Colonel Kászonyi, composed of ten other battalions of infantry and nine squadrons of Hussars. This last *corps d'armée* was, however, so diminished by the frequent battles and skirmishes in the neighborhood of Comorn, that it numbered scarcely 4,000 men; and all its artillery was carried off by the main army. At the urgent demand, however, of Klapka, backed with a threat of resigning his command of the garrison unless it were provided with sufficient artillery, Görgey sent back from the station of Bátorkeszi fifteen six-pounders, field-pieces without ammunition wagons.

Klapka now remaining commander-in-chief, both of the

troops in the garrison and in the intrenched camp, turned his chief attention to the further strengthening of the intrenched camp, to the organization and filling up of the various corps, and to the raising of as many batteries as possible. The construction of fortifications was therefore undertaken upon the right bank of the Danube, on the so-called "Monostor," the cannons found in the fortress were mounted on carriages, the ranks of the battalions filled up so far as possible from those of the sick and wounded, left behind by the main army, and the convalescent, numbering nearly 4,000, amounting to nearly 5,000, and two additional squadrons of Hussars newly formed; so that on the 22d of the same month a well-disciplined force of 20,000 men and nine complete batteries were at the disposition of the commander-in-chief.

Coinorn was at this time besieged by the second Austrian *corps d'armée* under Lieutenant Field-marshal Csorich, who had his head-quarters in Acs; Major-general Pott, who was posted on the left bank of the Danube; Major-general Prince Collorredo and Baron Barko on the right bank, and by Major-general Fiedler on the Schütt. The Russians under Grabbé, destined to cover the left bank, had not yet arrived.

Thus stood matters in and about the fortress when it was observed that, owing to the long stay of the main army at Comorn, some of the provisions of the garrison began to fail. Klapka therefore resolved to sally out on the right bank to procure grain and especially wine from Todis and Almás. This plan was successfully executed by Colonel Kosztolányi, with six battalions, four squadrons, and three batteries, on the 24th of July, who brought back, besides the desired supplies, several loaded baggage-wagons, an Austrian diligence with money, together with eleven officers and the entire detachment of infantry at Todis as prisoners.

Just at this time reports came in from our spies, that the men of Görgey's rear-guard, which had been partly dispersed, were collecting in the mountain of Maros, and that many of them had already approached as far as St. Péter, a small station of Comorn, on their way if possible to reach the fortress. To meet these new-comers and escort them in, a second expedition was undertaken early on the morning of the 30th of July, under the personal conduct of Klapka himself. The forces were divided into four columns of three battalions, one division of cavalry, and two batteries each. The first column operated in the Schütt towards Aranyos, the second attacked Kurta-keszi, the

third Hetény, the fourth O-Gyalla at the same time. The enemy nowhere maintained their ground, and only offered a weak resistance for a quarter of an hour on the heights of St. Péter; but they were very soon driven from there, and pursued till three o'clock in the afternoon beyond Ersek-Ujvár. The enemy lost, on this occasion, two full ammunition-wagons, about 200 killed and wounded, and 500 prisoners. Our loss, strange to tell, was one officer wounded, and one horse shot. These two successful sallies only increased Gen. Klapka's boldness, and he now determined to attack the besieging Austrian army with his whole force, and, if his plan were but half successful, to destroy it.

The 3d of August was fixed for the execution of this design, for which the troops were disposed as follows:—Col. Asserman led a column of six battalions, three divisions of hussars, and three foot-batteries, to flank the enemy, which broke up from the intrenched camp at midnight, and about four o'clock in the morning stormed Almás. The garrison were partly cut down, partly put to flight. After a short rest, this column, having left a small garrison in Almás and Neszmély, marched against Todis, and, finding this place unoccupied, next against

Kömlöd. At eight o'clock, another column of six battalions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and two batteries, advanced directly to Mocsá. It appeared before this place when the flanking column became visible on the heights of Kömlöd, just behind Mocsá. The garrison of Mocsá, which had heard nothing of the action at Almás, fell into no small confusion at seeing itself surrounded, and surprised that Gen. Aulich was in their rear.\* They retreated from the village after a short resistance, and endeavored to escape into the open country to the left, but, being already flanked by Asserman's hussars, they laid down their arms.

Both columns now proceeded on the course marked out for them. Asserman moved with his column towards Nagy-Igmánd, then crossed the Csoncso, and took possession, on his march thither, of forty loaded baggage-wagons, and 2,700 beef cattle, on their way to the Austro-Russian main army. Kosztolányi advanced against the redoubt

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\* The Austrians universally believed that Gen. Aulich was operating with a corps d'armée in the vicinity of the Platten See, although he was at this very time provisional minister of war, and we did not have any troops in that quarter.



of the enemy between Osém and Herkály, which was defended by nine eighteen-pounders. Meantime, the column of Schultz, consisting of three battalions of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and one battery, left our intrenched camp, and approached the above-mentioned redoubt in front, while Janik's column of three battalions, one howitzer, and one foot-battery, together with one division of hussars, manœuvred.

When the great redoubt was turned by the battalions of Kosztolányi's column, Schultz began his attack; and, although it was defended by twenty-one cannons, nine of which were eighteen-pounders, and six battalions of infantry, it was taken in less than half an hour by two weak Honvéd battalions.\* The enemy, forced from their strong position, ran in the utmost disorder towards Acs, their last place of refuge. Wald, to the right of Acs, having also been stormed by Janik. The retreat of the enemy was universal. Flanked on the right and left, they were all obliged to crowd over the bridge of Acs,

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\* The nearly equal loss of these two battalions is remarkable; of each there were eight killed, and of one thirty-eight, of the other forty wounded.

where the confusion was still further increased by the arrival, almost at the same time with the enemy, of our left flank, under my command. Had Asserman, with his flanking column, arrived but a quarter of an hour earlier in Acs, the whole army, with the head-quarters, would have fallen into our hands; as it was, however, he only came upon their rear, with which he made fearful havoc. All such of the enemy as were unable to conceal themselves in the corn-fields and vineyards that extend for miles around, now hastened to the bridge over the Danube, which was guarded by twenty-two eighteen-pounders. The approaching darkness favored their flight. The fugitives broke down the bridge after them, thus delivering into our hands many of their belated comrades. At about eleven o'clock at night the roaring of cannon ceased, and our troops bivouacked.

It was not till the next morning that we were enabled to comprehend the full extent of the great advantages that we had gained, with a very small loss on our side.\* Thousands of corpses strewed the field of battle; we had made

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\* Our loss, all told, was only one hundred and thirty dead and wounded.

about 3,000 prisoners, and captured twenty-seven cannon; an enormous supply of provisions intended for the Austro-Russian main army, that formed the cargo of thirty-five large vessels on the right shore of the Danube, also fell into our possession. On the morning of the fourth, Klapka sent forward some troops to Gönyö, where they made many more prisoners, and seized all the reserved supplies of the Austro-Russian main army, which were the more valuable to us as we were wanting seven-pound grenades. Another detachment was ordered to the island of Schütt, to prevent the assembling of the enemy there. They were, however, so possessed with their panic fear, that, at the bare sight of our column, they deserted their strong intrenchments, together with twenty-two eighteen-pounders, 40,000 bombs, and their bridge equipage, and fled in confusion to Presburg. The few Austrians who had taken refuge in Raab, on the same day, retired from that city, which was occupied by our troops on the 5th of August, without a single shot fired. Here, again, we found large stores of provisions, arms, and clothing, so that, not including the capture of forty-nine cannons, the value of Klapka's booty on this glorious day amounted to nearly six millions of guilders, (about \$3,000,000.)

Klapka now issued the necessary orders for the security of the garrison of Comorn, sent out recruiting commissions into the neighboring counties, now wholly freed from the enemy, and marched towards Raab with twelve battalions of infantry, four divisions of hussars, and six batteries. He at the same time commanded four battalions of infantry, three squadrons of horse, and two batteries to advance as far as Gross-Somerein to cover his flank. His further plan of operations was to act with one column against Vienna-Neustadt, with the other against Haimburg, to get control of the railroads from Neustadt and Bruck, and so if possible take Vienna, which was defended by only twelve battalions of infantry. The dispositions of the march were made accordingly. The advanced guards were to be pushed forward to Püspöki in the Schütt, the centre to come up to Wiselburg, and the left flank to pass Kapuvár.

At ten o'clock in the evening of the 10th of August, the main division was to leave Raab. At noon of the same day an official person of high rank, then on his flight, brought the information that Dembinsky, almost without a blow, had surrendered Szegedin, the seat of government and of the Diet, with all the military supplies stored at that place, and that his army had been totally defeated a few

days after near Lugos ; furthermore, that Bem had lost four battles in succession, that Görgey's rear-guard under General Nagy-Sándor was routed near Debreczin, and that Görgey himself had been for some time treating with the Russians. This news, and the reports from our scouts which reached us the same day, that the Austrian *corps d'armée* of Nugent, the division of Burica, Lederer's brigade, and the Russian division under Grabbé,\* were rapidly approaching Comorn, forced Klapka to renounce his intended plan, and instead of advancing we now retreated to Comorn. Here the arrangement and organization of the 7,000 men that had been raised in this brief period were pursued with the utmost energy. The Austrian army, which had re-assembled at the boundaries and was increased by several regiments, followed close upon our traces. So early as the 15th, its commander sent us a messenger with a flag of truce to request a cessation of hostilities for fourteen days, and at

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\* The two first-mentioned bodies of the enemy's troops were intended to cover the Austrian army of the south on the boundaries of Croatia ; Lederer was posted at Sárvár, and Grabbé was returning from his pursuit of Görgey, who had probably already concluded his negotiations with the Russians.

the same time called upon us to imitate the example of Görgey, who on the 11th of that month near Világos had surrendered at discretion. Although this news was not entirely unexpected by us, and although the adjutant of the Russian Czar who accompanied the flag of truce narrated to us the particulars of the whole procedure, we could not believe that Görgey had in the infamous depths of his treachery failed to secure the fate of his comrades in arms, and had surrendered without any conditions ; for to yield at discretion to Austria or Russia is, as the result has painfully demonstrated, to deliver one's self up to the executioner.

We now desired to know with definiteness regarding this matter. It was accordingly resolved, in a council of war, to accept the proposed armistice, on condition that the Austrian minister of war, who was at that time with the besieging army, should furnish passes to two deputations, one of which we intended sending to Arad and Transylvania, the other to Peterwardein and Temesvár. These deputations were to inform themselves accurately of the situation of affairs, and our further movements were in many respects to be guided by their reports. The condition was readily assented to on the part of the Austrians, and the two deputations, each accompanied by an Austrian

officer, were dispatched the very next day on their respective missions. In addition to the fulfillment of their ostensible duties, Klapka gave them secret instructions to the effect: if on finding that Görgey had actually yielded, that the main army under Dembinsky was dispersed, and that the government and Diet broken up, a successful continuance of the war should seem hopeless, they were to endeavor by all means to communicate with Colonel Kazinczy, who commanded about 8,000 troops in Mármaros and Beregher, and with the commandants of the garrisons of Arad and Peterwardein, to urge upon those officers in no case to lay down their arms, unless some general concessions favorable to the whole country were first obtained by all the remaining troops and garrisons; and to assure them that he on his part would contribute all his efforts to such an end, and, under any circumstances, rather hold out to the last man than surrender unconditionally. These deputations had scarcely left when individuals began to arrive in Comorn, at first from Görgey's army and afterward from that of Dembinsky, of Lázár, of Vécsey, even from Kazinczy, and finally stragglers from the garrison of Arad, forcing upon us the mournful truth that all was lost.

At last our deputations returned. One of them had been

allowed to proceed no further than Arad, which fortress had fallen before their arrival: and that too fell by Görgey's miserable treachery. Persuaded of Damjanics' courage and endurance, he had transferred to that garrison only those Wallachian battalions that had deserted a hundred times, and, as it were, thus forced that heroic commandant to a surrender which he also enjoined upon him in his capacity as Dictator. This deputation had a conference with Görgey, who had confirmed the surrender, and was then living at his ease in the Russian head-quarters. It was on this occasion that, in reply to the reproach of the deputy Rutkay, "that he was considered a traitor to his country," Görgey returned the answer worthy his infamous nature: "I care not what they consider me; I am not really a Hungarian but a Slave." The second deputation had been in Temesvár and spoken with Haynau. They brought a letter from that general, in which he advised Klapka, with idle threats in case of refusal, to an unconditional surrender of the fortress of Comorn within forty-eight hours. They were not permitted to go to Transylvania and Peterwardein, which greatly encouraged us, for we were persuaded that this fortress was still safe, and that Bem's army was still operating in Transylvania; since otherwise the deputation would



have been suffered also to go there. But the fact that we no longer had a government or a Diet, together with the reports received at this time from our political agents abroad, which informed us that we were not to look for aid nor intervention from France or England, caused us to ponder seriously what still remained to be saved for our poor country. Believing that an army still existed in Transylvania, and that Peterwardein was still unconquered, we resolved in a council of war to propose to Austria, in common with them, the following terms of capitulation, having in view our whole country :

1. A full amnesty for all political offences.
2. A general pardon for the surrendering army.
3. A sanctioning of the Hungarian paper-money.

These conditions we presented to the Austrian general of the ordnance, Count Nugent, who had meantime arrived before Comorn with the corps mentioned above, and assumed the command-in-chief of the collective troops, amounting to about 50,000 men. In reply, he declared that he was not empowered to enter into any such agreement, but would lay our demands before the Emperor, which he actually

did. No answer was ever returned.\* Meanwhile the armistice had terminated, and hostilities were just commencing again, when the discouraging news arrived that the army in Transylvania, demoralized by the treason of Görgey, was dispersing, and that Bem, Kossuth, and some other generals, with a small remnant of the Hungarian forces, had taken refuge in Turkish territory. A few days after accounts reached us of the fall of Peterwardein. The fate of this fortress was also owing to Görgey, whose order to yield on the same conditions that had been extended to himself, caused a dissension in the garrison which resulted in its surrender.†

Alone and without hope of relief, nothing now remained

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\* The requests were afterwards presented to the emperor in the form of a petition, but still remained unanswered.

† The unconditional surrender of nearly all the commandants is to be mainly ascribed to Görgey's shameful pretense of exerting his authority over them in his character of military and civil Dictator, summoning them to yield on the same conditions that had been granted to himself. They very naturally supposed that he had obtained honorable terms, and had no suspicion of the deceit practiced upon them till precaution was too late.

for the garrison of Comorn, but either to bury itself heroically under the ruins of their fortress, or to save, by an honorable military capitulation what could yet be saved for those who were within the fortress. For after the fall of Peterwardein, the Austrian commander would not listen for a moment to any conditions that should have in view the country at large. After many debates, the council of war accordingly resolved upon the latter course for the following reasons :

1. To alleviate the fate of our captured brethren, and to put a stop to the frequent executions, for we were encouraged to believe that all military persecutions (military trials) would cease upon the surrender of Comorn.

2. In order not to expose to utter ruin the city of Comorn, with its 20,000 inhabitants, who had already severely suffered by fire and by the bombardment of the previous winter that continued for five weeks.

3. To save a numerous body of men charged with political offences, who had taken refuge in Comorn.

4. To relieve the inhabitants of the surrounding country, already sufficiently impoverished, from the hardship of quartering Russian, and still worse, Austrian soldiers.

Lastly :

5. To preserve 27,000 brave and zealous soldiers for their country and a more auspicious future.

The terms now proposed to the commander of the besieging forces, in which, however, Nugent pretended not fully to concur, were, with slight modifications, the same as the articles of capitulation that follow. But as many of us still doubted of the actual fall of Peterwardein, and would assent to enter upon no definitive arrangement until they were accurately informed upon that point, Nugent proposed that four of our number should proceed on an Austrian steamboat to that garrison, and the negotiations be suspended till their return.

## CAPITULATION OF COMORN.

In the meantime Nugent was recalled, and Haynau took command in person of the besieging corps, of which change he informed us in a really handsome letter. In it he invited Klapka, together with those officers who were most prominent in opposing a surrender, to a meeting at such time and place as Klapka himself should designate, under the escort of a half squadron of cavalry; and gave his word of honor that in this proposal, he had nothing in view

but the best good of Hungary, and of the garrison of Comorn. Upon the receipt of this missive, a council of war was held, in which it was determined to accept the invitation at ten o'clock on the following morning. Klapka, however, excused himself from attendance, under pretext of indisposition. On the 27th of September, those who afterwards signed the articles of capitulation, with an escort under the command of Colonel Asserman, proceeded to the place of meeting at the enemy's redoubt near Herkály. They found there a tent pitched, about which soldiers in great parade were keeping guard. Haynau arrived soon after, attended only by his adjutant Susan, and received us with so great attention, that we were no longer able to believe in the justness of the reputation that had preceded him. He bid us be seated with the utmost courtesy, took his place among us, and in a familiar friendly manner set forth to us : that our obstinate resistance could no longer benefit our cause, since there was no other Hungarian force to co-operate with us ; that now, when peace was restored to all other parts of the monarchy, he could assemble before Comorn as many troops and materials for besieging as he chose ; that no fortress could hold out for a long time against a regular siege, and that, to use his own

words, he would not say in two, three, four, or six months, but sooner or later he must take Comorn ; that in such case we should have to answer for the additional bloodshed—which, however, in his opinion was but a secondary matter, since God so willed it ; that by this resistance the already impoverished land would be still more heavily burdened, since Hungary alone should bear the expenses of the siege ; finally, that the punishments for political offences would not cease until the pacification of Hungary was complete, which could not be so long as Comorn remained unsubdued. On this latter point he affirmed three several times, that the executions would be at an end immediately on our yielding. In conclusion, he encouraged us to rely upon the good nature and magnanimity of the youthful emperor, and to throw ourselves on his mercy. On our part we frankly acknowledged that there was reason in all he said, but so long as we had our arms in our hands, we did not need to depend on the magnanimity or benevolence of the emperor ; furthermore, that the Austrian dynasty and government had by no means acted towards Hungary in a way to inspire confidence ; we would therefore never submit to an unconditional surrender, but insist upon the admission and fulfillment of our moderate demands.

He then inquired what our demands were, and we were not a little astonished to hear him meet each point, as it was brought forward, with the answer, "that is well, that can be granted," when his predecessor, Nugent, had refused assent to the same terms. He hesitated only in regard to three points: respecting the amnesty for all persons in Comorn, whether of a civil, military, or clerical character; respecting the assuming the payment of the paper money issued by us; and, lastly, respecting our demand of a written guarantee for the observance of the capitulations, subscribed by the Emperor of Austria and the Russian general Grabbé. The first difficulty was evaded by his own proposal to enroll as military all those compromised in Comorn, whether civilians or clergy. By this means they would be included in the capitulation. Considering the occupants of Comorn only as a garrison, he would treat with it only by military rules, with political and civil affairs generally he would not in the least intermeddle. As to our paper money, he promised to pay us 500,000 guilders, instead of the 800,000 we had actually raised, and hoped that, in consideration of the loss always incurred from paper money, we would submit to a little discount. With relation to the guarantee, he would have nothing to

do. He was, as he expressed himself, civil and military governor of Hungary, with full powers. What he guaranteed was sacred. His honor and reputation as a soldier were sufficient pledges to us for every thing. I will confess, for my own part, that I did depend on his word; for he was the only Austrian general whose bulletins had been free from extravagant statements, and he had, so far as I knew, always remained faithful to his word. Nor do I believe that he would of himself have been guilty of such shameful violations of the capitulation as afterwards occurred, had he not been forced to commit them by the court, and especially by that blood-thirsty, unhumanized woman, the mother of the emperor. This opinion is supported by the circumstance, that, shortly after the surrender of Comorn, there was an attempt to remove him from Hungary, probably because he was unwilling to enter into the infernal designs of the empress mother. Haynau, the bastard of a crowned monster, is a cold, proud aristocrat, an unfeeling tyrant, a gross, uncultivated man, but yet a man who would not break his word of honor so long as he could in any other way preserve the favor of the court, the highest aim of every heartless aristocrat.

Immediately after the discussion of the three points, Hay-



nau desired to proceed to the definite arrangement of the capitulation. But we were not empowered to make any alterations in the prescribed terms, and, after promising to send to him at Acs, on the same evening, the final resolution of the council of war, we rode back to Comorn to make our report of the negotiations. After long debate, the council of war assented to the requisite alterations, and commissioned us to go to Acs and close the capitulation, subject to this condition, that the deputation we had sent to Peterwardein should confirm the announcement of the fall of that place. We accordingly rode to the enemy's head-quarters, where we were greeted with music and huzzas, and then signed the following articles of capitulation :

SURRENDER OF THE FORTRESS OF COMORN UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS.

1. The garrison are to be allowed freely to withdraw, without arms; the swords of the officers to remain in their possession.

Foreign passports shall be granted to those officers who have formerly served in the imperial army; to those who do not ask

~~for~~ passports to other countries, a free dismission to their homes  
~~—~~excepting such as voluntarily enter the imperial service.

A free residence at their homes shall be granted to the Honvéd officers not previously in the imperial service, without restriction as to their future conduct and occupation.

An amnesty is granted to the rank and file of the imperial regiments, and to those individuals who have been meantime promoted. They are to remain unmolested, and no legal prosecution shall hereafter be conducted against them.

2. Passports abroad shall be furnished to all who apply for them within thirty days.

3. One month's pay to the officers, and ten day's wages to the rank and file, according to the rates of the Austrian service, shall be paid in Austrian national bank-notes.

4. For the settlement of the various obligations entered into by the garrison, as shown by their orders on the military chest, the sum of 500,000 guilders, *convention's münze*, (about \$250,000,) shall be paid in Austrian bank-notes.

5. The sick and wounded in Comorn, and in the hospitals, shall be properly cared for.

6. Private property, both real and personal, shall be generally retained by the owners.

7. The place, time, and manner of giving up the arms, shall be hereafter determined.

8. All hostilities shall immediately cease on both sides.

9. The fortress shall be given up according to the usages of war, after a mutual ratification of the conditions.

{ PUSZTA-HERKALY, *Sept. 27th*, 1849.  
Haynau, M. P.

Takáts, captain.

Gasparetz, captain

Mednyánsky, colonel.

John Prágay, colonel.

Stefan Rutkay, colonel.

Count Otto Zichy, colonel.

Count Paul Esterházy, colonel.

John Janik, colonel.

Sigmund Szabó, colonel, commandant in the town.

Joseph von Kászonyi, colonel.

Francis Asserman, colonel, commandant in the fortress.

George Klapka, commander-in-chief of fortress and troops.

{ A true copy of the original,  
COMORN, *Sept. 29*, 1849.  
Szillányi, lieut.-colonel,  
chief of the general-staff.

The following day Haynau sent Gen. Nobili, a commissary, one officer of the engineer corps, and one of the artillery, to make the preliminary inventory. Several other officers came to the fortress, both Austrian and Russian. The latter often drank to Kossuth's health, and associated with our officers on the most friendly terms, but showed no respect for the Austrians, and even quarreled with them on

every possible occasion—a proof how even the Russians disapproved and despised the arrogant and impudent conduct of the Austrians, whose greatest courage was displayed in scourging women of the highest families.

On the 27th of September, our deputation arrived with a final confirmation of the surrender of Peterwardein, and the respective garrisons left and entered our works as follows :—the Austrians took possession of the intrenched camp on the right bank of the Danube on the 30th of September ; of the *tête-du-pont* and the fortress on the 1st of October ; of the *Palatinal lines* on the 2d ; and of Waag fort on the 3d. The retiring divisions as they withdrew were furnished with a safe-conduct, and marched under the command of their officers to their homes, where they were disbanded.\* It was a heart-breaking scene, when our brave troops—many of them

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\* SAFE-CONDUCT.

For Mr. John Prágay, who may return unhindered to his place of residence, Aszonyfa, in the county of Raab. As a member of the garrison of Comorn, he participates in all the privileges granted to the same, regarding security of person and property.

[L. s.]

BAYERSFELD,

Imperial army-commissioner.

COMORN, Oct. 1st, 1849.

victors in thirty or more battles—were obliged to give their arms to an enemy who had always fled before them but the country demanded their preservation, and they yielded with bursting hearts, but with manly firmness, to their fate. But of the banners that had waved before them in so many glorious contests, each one would take with him a little shred—a talisman to keep the past ever fresh in memory, and to rouse to new deeds of heroism in the future—they were torn into as many parts as there were men who had fought under them. The sixth regiment of hussars, in the sally of the 3d of August, had thrice charged the hostile Uhlans through the masses of infantry, and thrice defeated them. When Klapka, in accordance with the first article, and in presence of the whole staff of the enemy, asked if there were any in this regiment who would step forward in token of their wish to enter the Austrian service—he was met with the reply, “Nay, sir, we will serve our Hungarian fatherland, but Austria never.” Tears of gladness started from Klapka’s eyes, and, paying no heed to the foreign generals, he galloped off with the bold, confident feeling of hope for a speedy and successful restoration of the good cause.

I was one day in Comorn after all our troops had marched

out. There the conduct of the Austrians was in general handsome towards us, which was I think to be attributed, however, to the energetic interposition of the commandant, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Nobili, or perhaps, rather, to the circumstance that they were held in restraint by the Russians ; but without the limits of the fortifications, it was very different. I myself saw Honvéds, who had remained behind in the hospitals or transport-houses, and were going home in little bands of five or six, attacked immediately after crossing the bridge by Austrian soldiers, and robbed of their last *heller*,\* nay even of the better portions of their uniforms. These robberies took place in the immediate neighborhood of the officers, and, though I will not affirm that they encouraged their men to commit, I am sufficiently convinced that they silently permitted these disgraceful actions.

Klapka is much to be censured for having opened the fortifications to the enemy before the capitulation was fulfilled in all points. He must have known that with the Austrians nothing is sacred in heaven or earth. The consequences of this overhaste have been already severely felt by many of our

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\* The smallest kind of coin.

unhappy comrades, and by Klapka himself in Berlin and Düsseldorf. 260 of us, mostly officers, desired passports under the second article of the capitulation; some to Turkey, some to other European states, and a portion of us to America. As adjutant-general of the army, it became my duty to draw up as rapidly as possible national and personal descriptions of these applicants, add their proposed destinations, and hand them to Gen. Nobili, so that the passports might be sent down from Vienna by the time of the surrender. Meantime these were not waited for, but, on the assurance of Gen. Susan that they would certainly come to hand in a few days, the place was surrendered. And what was the result? In my own case, for example—I had requested a passport to Germany, Belgium, France, and England, and received, instead, one of which the following is a literal copy.

#### PASSPORT.

For the duration of the journey designated below: for Mr. John Prágay. Character, a Hungarian emigrant. To America, by Oderberg, Breslau, and Hamburg. He is to travel on the direct route, without stopping or returning, (*ohne aufenthalt und ohne Rückkehr.*) He is accompanied by his former servant, Paul Zwickl. N. B. He is provided with the necessary means of

traveling. [Here follows a particular description of the bearer's person, age, stature, etc.] It is desired that the bearer, on showing this passport, may be allowed to proceed without hinderance.

From the royal imperial city government of Vienna, Oct. 5th, 1849.

[L. s.] The royal imperial ministerial councilor and captain of the city, RAZZER, M. P.

Many of my companions who wished to go to Turkey received no passport at all, and now, in spite of the 1st and 2d articles, must endure the oppressive yoke of Austria, or perhaps starve in their wretchedness. How carefully the remaining articles, which Haynau had declared to be sacred, were observed, is clearly enough shown in the execution of Major Repeczky, the imprisonment of William Csapó, the sequestration of Zichy's estates, and of others who were all in Comorn up to the end, and the first of whom was seized and executed while on his road home.

In conclusion, I have one urgent request to make to my honored readers. I would beg them to compare together the capitulation, the safe-conduct, and my traveling passport, and have the kindness to tell me how I came to receive a passport restricted by the clause, "without stopping or returning," when a safe residence at my own home



is guaranteed by two documents? And that my honored readers may have still another bright example of the logical consistency that reigns throughout the actions of the Austrian government, I will introduce here a little story, which I can not refrain from telling, although the modest Klapka forbade its publication in his lifetime.

The date of this story is the time when Comorn was beleaguered by 50,000 Austrians and 26,000 Russians, under the command of Count Nugent; and, on a certain afternoon, when two messengers with a flag of truce—the Austrian, Lieutenant-colonel Jungbauer, and one Kreipel, a captain of horse—brought into Comorn the report that Peterwardein had yielded. In addition to this information, these two gentlemen brought with them a little note, which contained nothing less than a notice that his royal imperial apostolic majesty had most graciously resolved to bestow upon the insurgent leader, Klapka, as a reward for his very humane treatment of the Austrian prisoners in Comorn, a large pension, which should be secured to him in any foreign country he would designate. If I rightly remember, Klapka hereupon answered, in a very decided manner, “that he had earned honor and fame with his comrades, and was ready to share with them their poverty and misfor-

tunes ; he therefore begged respectfully to decline the most gracious kindness of his royal imperial apostolical majesty, and would only humbly request his royal imperial apostolical majesty, Franz-Joseph, that, if this pension were really designed for him, it might be applied to the assistance of those families who had lost their all in the contest for Hungarian freedom." The sequel and the moral of the story is, that Klapka, who was to enjoy a pension in any foreign country he chose to designate, received a passport to England or America "without stop or return."

## IX.

### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE MOST PROMINENT STATES- MEN AND GENERALS.

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#### LOUIS KOSSUTH, GOVERNOR OF HUNGARY.

KOSSUTH's ancestors, who were originally of a noble house in the county of Turoczer, had been for some generations settled in the county of Zemplin, where he was born in 1806. His parents were of honorable station, and independent though not wealthy. His father was an advocate of reputation ; his mother, a woman of a fine mind, guided the education of her numerous family. Kossuth was taught in the schools at Ujhely, Patak, and Eperjes. At this early period, he already gave such proofs of his remarkable talents that his teacher prophesied his future greatness.

Like most cultivated men of his class in Hungary, he turned his attention to the law, and by his superior mental gifts, speedily rose to the first position among his brethren

of the county of Zemplin. He began his political course in the same county, where by virtue of his extensive acquirements, and especially of his eloquence, he soon occupied a foremost place in the ranks of the opposition.

He first took part in the affairs of the country at large in 1836. He was then sent to the Diet as the substitute of an absent magnate. In that capacity he held a seat in the Chamber of Deputies; but the laws then gave no influence to this kind of substitute. He shortly after left this post. All the greater became his influence and authority by the publication of a periodical entitled, "Reports of the Diet." At that time the extremely strict Austrian censorship canceled every free word. The proceedings of the Diet either did not appear before the public at all, or at best only in a mutilated form. The want of more accurate information in this respect was generally felt throughout Hungary, and by none more than by Kossuth, whose whole soul was already striving after freedom, and after all those means by which this holy treasure could be attained. He accordingly resolved to publish in manuscript, under the above title, all the speeches and proceedings of the Diet. For this purpose he learned stenography, and employed a number of short-hand writers. Although the expenses of writing

made his paper very costly, it received a large number of subscribers, and soon became the first and most powerful of the public agents in the field on the side of the country and its constitutional interests.

He made an attempt to give his paper a wider circulation by having it lithographed, but he met with hinderances on every hand. The press was at last arbitrarily confiscated, and he was again restricted to its distribution in manuscript.

After the close of the Diet, he continued in the same form "Debates of the County Assemblies," and removed with his family to Pesth, the central point of the country, where he also practiced his profession.

The Austrian government was not long in perceiving that by the circulation of free thoughts, the most powerful means of oppression was torn from its hands; and, in accordance with its wonted policy, did not hesitate a moment to resort to illegal measures.

Kossuth was brought to trial on a charge of high treason. Although by the Hungarian law, no one shall be confined on this charge till a decision has been given, but shall be permitted to conduct their defence in freedom, Kossuth was torn from his quiet dwelling in Ofen and from

the midst of his family, and led to prison. The trial was had before the highest court, whose judges are appointed by the government ; whose decisions are guided not by justice, but by the will of that government. Kossuth was accordingly condemned to an imprisonment of three years.

This violation of the constitution raised the greatest commotion throughout Hungary. The excitement rose to such a pitch that at the next meeting of the Diet, the government found no other way of redeeming its mistake but, under the pretext of a request to that effect from the then palatine, to release Kossuth from the brief remainder of his confinement, and at the same time to give up the intended prosecution of several other members of the opposition for the same crime.

Restored to freedom, Kossuth, edited an excellent newspaper in Pesth, and pursued his political career in the assemblies of the county of Pesth, which at that time stood at the head of the opposition. In spite of the utmost efforts of the government to defeat his election, he was chosen to represent this county in the Diet of 848, by an almost unanimous vote.

In the Diet he played the first part, and was the almost uncontrolled leader of the opposition. At a late period of

the same year, he undertook the department of finance in the ministry united under Count Ludwig Batthyány.

After Batthyány's resignation, he became president of the committee of public defense, and when the declaration of independence was proclaimed on the 14th of April, 1849, in the cathedral of Debreczin amid the huzzas of the assembled people, the Diet appointed him governor of Hungary. His wonderful activity and energy in the two last-named offices, were sufficiently attested by the glorious issue of the first campaign with Austria. In a country hedged in on every side by hostile nations, and with nothing in hand, he raised money, arms, and a military force, which drove the self-styled invincible Austrian army out of the land, with a loss of 74,000 men, dead or disabled.

How complete and general was the confidence in the purity of his patriotism and in his irreproachable integrity, is sufficiently proved by the fact that there was nowhere the least opposition formed against him, not even among the magnates, who by the abolition of feudal service and tithes were deprived of half their revenues. His last public act showed in the clearest light his entire self-sacrificing love for his country. When in the month of August he resigned in favor of Görgey a position in which he had

been placed by the wishes of millions of his countrymen, he did so in the belief that the ambition of that general might be thus contented, and the country saved. How sorely was he to be disappointed !

After his abdication he retired into Transylvania, whence, upon learning the treachery of Görgey, he took refuge in Turkey. He there remains, and is indeed at present held a prisoner by the Turkish government in the fortress of Schumla.

#### COUNT LOUIS BATHYÁNY

Was descended from an ancient Hungarian family, many of whose members were distinguished in former times, both in political and military life. Always taking an active part in the political affairs of his country, he soon became, by virtue of his superior mental gifts, of his wealth, which then contributed so largely to any man's political advancement, but above all by virtue of the firmness and energy which were leading traits in his character, one of the most influential members of the assembly of magnates. After the Diet of 1836, that is from the time that Austria began to pursue systematically an oppressive colonial policy to-



wards Hungary, a constitutional liberal opposition was organized in the country. A central committee was established at Buda-Pesth, whose business was to correspond with affiliated committees in other counties, to unite and develop the opinions and actions of those opposed to the attacks of Austria upon the constitutional independence of Hungary, and so break the force of those attacks. It also proposed another end, namely, to guide the national movement in accordance with the spirit of the age and the universal principles of freedom, and lay the foundation of a purely democratic constitution for the future. Louis Batthyány was placed at the head of this committee, and the correspondence with the other committees was carried on through him.

When, therefore, in 1848, the time came for the principles of the opposition to triumph over their conservative opponents, nothing was more natural than that he should be proposed as prime minister of the first independent Hungarian ministry. In March, the government, which then yielded every thing, appointed him to that office. When this ministry was dissolved in September of the same year, he was reappointed president of the new ministry, but his selection of colleagues not being ratified by the

government, his functions were at an end. He was placed on the committee of public defense by the Diet.

When in the latter part of December the Diet removed from Buda-Pesth to Debreczin, one more attempt was made to settle matters with Austria without further bloodshed. A deputation of five members was sent to Windischgrätz, with Batthyány at their head. They repaired to the camp of Windischgrätz near Ofen, under an escort of hussars. In defiance of laws that prevail even among barbarous nations, these purely peaceful deputies, together with their escort, were detained as prisoners. Windischgrätz's answer was "Unconditional submission." The imprisoned delegates could make their report to the Diet at Debreczin only in writing. Four of them were afterwards graciously released. Batthyány, who was unyielding, and—which was the main thing with Austria—the owner of estates worth seven millions of guilders, was dragged from prison to prison, and tormented with examinations. He had but one answer to the questions of his persecutors: "Let me," he said, "be confronted with the Archduke Stephen, the palatine of the kingdom who shamefully deserted his post. I have done nothing but to carry into practice those measures which he the palatine and fully-authorized agent of the

king, has constantly approved." And therefore, that there might be no living witness to testify the base treachery and falsehood of the palatine, and above all that Austria might clutch with her greedy hands the seven millions' worth of property, Batthyány was condemned—condemned by judges who were the ready tools of a wicked government. He was shot, according to sentence, early in October, 1849. Batthyány was a man of stately bearing; he was about forty-five years of age.

#### BARTHOLOMEW SZEMERE

Was born in the county of Borsod, which is noted for the prevalence of liberal opinions amongst its people, and where he imbibed those principles almost with his mother's milk.

His early education was most carefully attended to. He was instructed in almost all the modern cultivated languages, which were afterwards of much benefit to him in a journey through Europe, undertaken mainly for the purpose of examining institutions of punishment and correction. Upon his return home, he published an account of his

travels, and also a work on systems of punishment and correction.

— In his county, where he entered on his political career, he was first chosen a chief of the magistracy, then vice-governor of the county, and lastly a representative to the Diet.

He afterward became a member of the Committee of Public Defense, and Government Commissioner of the Upper Districts. After the 14th of April, Kossuth appointed him President of the Ministry, with the special department of the Interior. In this character he brought before the Diet his republican programme, which was accepted with unhesitating, warm approval. He was the most forward republican in the Hungarian ministry.

When Görgey's treachery became known, Szemere followed Kossuth into Turkey, from whence, however, on perceiving the intentions of the Turkish government, he happily escaped, and is now residing in Paris. Szemere is a man not far from thirty-six years old, of a strong frame and handsome exterior.

## LADISLAUS CSÁNYI

Was a native of the county of Szala. He passed his youth in the military service of Austria as an officer of hussars, where he contracted a military manner which did not ill become his tall stature, and which he preserved through life. This manner, however, had nothing of the abject submissiveness, which ruled in the Austrian army when he was a young man more than now. His free, active spirit, revealed to him too clearly the faults and consequences of a slavish discipline, that would restrain not only free expressions, but free thoughts. He soon grew weary of a life that did not correspond with his disposition, and retired to his native county, where he soon became engaged in political affairs. At that period this county was at the head of those movements that were progressing in the spirit of the times. The famous Deák was not only then the leading spirit of the county, but the first man in the diet of 1836. When a base party, composed of aristocrats, reactionists, and bigots, and paid by the Austrian government, opposed Deák's re-election to the coming Diet, by disgraceful means, Csányi took the part of his friend

with the greatest energy. This was the origin of the close league between the two men. In the year 1848 he was chosen with Deák one of the popular representatives in the Diet at Buda-Pesth. Well known for his energetic character, he was selected by the ministry of the period as a leader of the national guards and popular movement, against the first attacks of the Croats on the provinces of the Drave, beyond the Danube. He did all that had been expected of him. When the Hungarian army was more organized, and most of the national guards were transformed into volunteer battalions, Csányi was sent by the Diet to the camp, as a commissioner fully empowered to act on the part of the government, and associated with General Moga. He displayed much decision and foresight in performing the duties of this office. He remained for a time associated with Görgey in the same capacity, when that general took the chief command of the army. Had he continued with Görgey, it is not altogether improbable that the dignity of his character and his friendly persuasive power, had permanently exerted the influence that they at first acquired over the young man, and prevented the treason that arose from a wild ambition. But such men as Csányi were needed elsewhere, and he was sent as first

commissioner into Transylvania, which was then almost lost to the patriots. He and Bem acted there so vigorously, that they soon cleared the country of the Russians and Austrians. He next became a member of the last independent ministry, in which he took the department of trade and communication. Trusting to the representations of the Russian generals, who assured him of safety in the closing scenes at Világos, he did not seek in flight the only means of escaping from the perfidy of Austria, but remained to witness the foul shame that Görgey brought upon his country. Perhaps also his advanced age—he was sixty years old—and his feeble health, rendered him unable to endure the fatigues of a hasty flight.

For the first few days he was treated with indulgence, but was soon thrown into prison, then dragged to Budapesth, and then condemned to death on the gallows, the 10th of October, 1849. He had no family to join in the deep mourning of his country and of numberless friends. Tested by the rules of tyranny, the vengeance of Austria in regard to this true man was not unjustified ; for it can not be denied that there were few men in Hungary, whose energetic patriotism had done so much injury to the House of Austria.

## BARON LADISLAUS PERÉNYI

Was likewise of an ancient Hungarian family, resident in the county of Ugocsa, in the Theiss district, which was always the stronghold of true Magyarism. The hatred to Austria was there irreconcilable, and there had been enacted the most important events of Rákoczi's revolution. Well known as a man of great legal attainments and of an upright character, he had been appointed by the Austrian government Vice-president of the highest court, and had long filled the office of Lord-lieutenant (Obergespann) of his native county. During the proceedings, in the trials for high treason, against Kossuth and Baron Nicholas Weselényi, and against several other members of the opposition, which ended with a sentence of three years' imprisonment for Kossuth, he distinguished himself among the few independent judges. When George Mailáth, who was the Chief Justice, (Oberlandesrichter,) and, ex officio, also President of the Assembly of Magnates, (Magnatentafel,) either from cowardice or perfidy, deserted his post in December, 1848, the honest Perényi considered it his duty to assume that office which belonged to him



as Vice-president. He presided over the deliberations of the Upper-house at Debreczin, and at other places where it afterwards assembled, in a manner that gave entire satisfaction, and inspired the fullest confidence. In Debreczin he signed the Declaration of Independence, in company with the President of the House of Deputies and the secretaries of both branches. This was a deadly sin in the eyes of Austria, which was atoned for by his ignominious death on the gallows in October, 1849. The utmost firmness, and a calmness of spirit such as belong only to those conscious of the righteousness of their cause, did not forsake him at the last moment. Perényi was taken prisoner at the catastrophe of Görgey's treachery at Világos. He was aged about sixty, and of venerable appearance.

#### ARTHUR GÖRGEY

Was born in the year 1817, of noble and tolerably wealthy parents, at Busocz in the county of Zips. Although the majority of the inhabitants of this county are Germans or Slaves, few surpassed it during the late revolution in patriotism and love of liberty.

After finishing his studies at the Gymnasium of Késmark, he entered the Pioneer-school at Tulln as a cadet, and from there an Austrian regiment, whence he was soon after transferred to a lieutenancy in the noble Hungarian body-guard. He already showed an eccentric character. He was the inseparable friend of his fellow-guardsman, Count Zsigray, who afterwards in a fit of hypochondria committed suicide. He greatly distinguished himself by his talents. He was a most diligent scholar and made rapid progress, especially in the mathematical sciences, so that at the end of his five years he became a first lieutenant in the Austrian army—the proof of his acquirements.

He remained but a little time with his regiment. He fell in love with the governess of a noble family, and as neither of the parties were able to furnish the earnest-money—quite a large sum—required in case of marriage, he left the army and relinquished all claim to a future resumption of his title.

His favorite study had always been chemistry, and after quitting the army he occupied himself exclusively with this branch of science. His acquirements in this department procured for him the position of Assistant in Chemistry in Prague University. This office he soon left, and repaired

to Bielitz in Galicia, to make himself better acquainted with the cloth manufacture. While he was thus employed the revolution broke out. On the receipt of the news he immediately returned home. On arriving in Hungary, he was appointed a captain of Honvéds, and soon after a major in the national guard. In this capacity he ordered Count Eugene Zichy, count palatine of Stuhlweissenburg, who had entered into an understanding with Jellachich, to be hung on the island of Csepel, which had been committed to his charge after the battle of Pákozd.

On the 30th of October, Görgey saved the army from the snare into which it was brought by Gen. Moga's error, and was promoted by Kossuth on the spot to be its provisional commander-in-chief.

How he withdrew to Pesth, and thence conducted his famous retreat by the way of the mining towns to Kaschau, I have already narrated. I must mention here that in the course of this retreat he issued a proclamation to the troops hostile to the revolutionary government, in which he calls them the royal Hungarian army, and introduces the suggestion that they should raise him to the Dictatorship. This was almost the only body of troops in Hungary which was fully equipped, and in every way fit for service. This

**P**roclamation resulted in nothing. The troops were more attached to Kossuth than to him.

Many have accused Görgey of being already in intelligence with Windischgrätz at the time he was under Dembinsky, and that therefore he came so late into the action of Kápolna. This charge is groundless, as is clearly proved by his later actions ; and although, setting aside the imperfect and wrong dispositions in this battle, he did not appear at the proper time on the battle-field, the cause of the tardiness lay not in an understanding between him and Windischgrätz, but in the dissensions between himself and Dembinsky.

How, after Dembinsky's resignation and Vetter's sickness, Görgey took command of the army, and led it from victory to victory up to the relief of Comorn on the 26th of April ; how, after that battle, instead of pursuing the Austrians, he remained before that city, and after long deliberation, instead of marching against Vienna, proceeded to Ofen ; how, at the end of a siege of twenty-three days, he stormed that fortress on the 21st of May, and then made another longer sojourn there, thus giving full time to the Austrians to assemble, and to the Russians to unite with them and break into Hungary—all this has been previously

related. Procrastination was his great failing. Bem very justly remarked : " Görgey can defeat but not destroy an enemy." I have also already told how, during the months of June and July, he fought several battles in the neighborhood of Comorn with the Russians and Austrians, when and how he retired from that quarter, and finally, how he betrayed his country. It only remains to add a few facts illustrative of the character of this individual who has earned for himself the fame of a Herostratus.

As I have already intimated, Görgey's character was marked with striking peculiarities. United with an immoderate ambition was a great capacity of self-denial. After the taking of Ofen, the government promoted him to the rank of lieutenant field-marshal, and sent a deputation to offer him, at the same time with his commission, the grand cross of the Order of Military Merit. He refused both the rank and the token of honor, declaring that so long as there was a single enemy on Hungarian soil, he felt himself unworthy of their acceptance. When he was in Bielitz, in very difficult circumstances, a friend offered him segars ; although he was passionately fond of smoking, he would not take them, saying that he would smoke no segars, even if given to him, till he was abundantly able to buy them.

After the action of Waitzen, he passed the whole night in a fast-falling rain, on an open wagon in a court-yard, while all his aids were comfortably lying in beds. Except for washing, he did not undress during the whole campaign. Till the month of June, 1849, he wore one seal-skin coat, which he had won from an officer at cards. It then suddenly occurred to him to clothe himself quite brilliantly. He had a coat made of a light red color and ornamented with very broad bands of gold lace, and led all attacks and assaults in this uniform, which was well known to the enemy. Görgey's chief excellencies as a general were extraordinary courage, coolness, and foresight, great energy so long as he was in the presence of the enemy, and a peculiar talent of haranguing his troops. He troubled himself very little about tactics and strategy.

Görgey was the sternest revolutionist in the country. He would give sentence of death, and look upon its execution with the utmost calmness. Nothing could move him to change his decision. He ordered one of his former comrades of the guard, his intimate friend Captain Udvarnoky, to be shot on account of insubordination to his major. Nor would he listen to the victim's defense, or the entreaties of his friends in his favor. His passions of ambition and

vengeance were unrestrained. He betrayed his country not for paltry gold, but because he had not been able to obtain the highest office, and because he had been subordinated to another general.

He had neither a good heart nor a right sense of honor ; otherwise he would not have committed Csányi, who always treated him like a father, and the other members of the ministry and the Diet, who had confidently intrusted their fate to him, into the hands of a tyrannical government ; he would not have delivered his comrades and general-staff, who, unconsciously indeed but really, had promoted his criminal designs, and for whose safety he had pledged his word of honor, into the clutches of the executioner. He might perhaps in this respect have been deceived by Paskiewics ; but an honorable man in such circumstances could not look upon the evil fate that befell his companions, and still live.

Görgey is of a tall slender figure, and a penetrating eye. He is at present residing under surveillance at Klagenfurt in Styria.

## GEORGE KLAPKA

Is the son of a former burgomaster of Temesvár, where he was born in the year 1820. When he had completed his studies in his birthplace, he was received as a cadet in the artillery, from which, in 1842, he was transferred to the Hungarian body-guard. He here, like Görgey, distinguished himself by remarkable talents, and like him was made a first lieutenant in the Austrian army—a promotion conferred only on those of the first abilities. A desire for freedom and independence soon caused him to give up this situation. He was in Pesth in May, 1848, just at the time when the first battalions of Honvéds were organized to proceed against the Servians. He obtained a captaincy in the first battalion, and was in the campaign against that people until September. His extensive acquirements in military science were soon observed, and he was promoted to the general-staff, with a commission to undertake the direction of works upon some fortifications at Comorn. He was soon after one of those who induced the troops there to swear to the new constitution, and thus



preserved for Hungary this garrison that was already half betrayed to Austria. After he had completed the business for which he was sent to Comorn, he was ordered to join the army on the frontier, with which he remained through several battles and the retreat to Pesth.

After the check that Mészáros received at Kaschau, the command of the army of the upper Theiss was conferred upon Klapka with the rank of colonel. He entered upon his new duties on the 13th of January. He defended the line of the Theiss, with great ability, against a vastly superior force, who were trying every means to force a passage; in the same month defeated the combined corps of Schlick and Schulzig, and saved the government and Diet, then in a very critical situation at Debreczin, from dissolution, or at least from another removal. The government expressed their thanks by a general's commission.

Placed under the command of Dembinsky, Klapka led in the fight of Hidasnémeti, Mezzökövesd, in the surprise of Pétervásár, and of Kompolt, in the battle of Egerfarmos, and the two days' action of Kápolna. He also took part in the attack upon Szolnok, and, as chief of the general-staff and commander of the first *corps d'armée*, in all the victorious advances upon Comorn, in the course of which he displayed

his admirable foresight in devising the plan of flanking Gödöllő.

In the latter part of April, he undertook the provisional administration of the ministry of war. He left this post a month later to take command of the seventh and eighth *corps d'armée*. He was engaged in all the actions of June and July about Comorn, and in all displayed unmistakable proofs of his great military skill and acquirements. After Görgey retired from Comorn, he, Klapka, became commander-in-chief of all the troops in the fortress and about the city.

How he conducted three successful attacks upon the besiegers, how he rejected the base proposal of the Emperor of Austria, how he escaped assassination, and how, when all else was already lost, he saved the military honor of the Hungarian army by an honorable capitulation, I have related in the foregoing pages. Of his noble, generous heart, by whose impulses he was sometimes indeed misled, I will not here speak, and will only add, that, high-spirited and honorable, he was, with the exception of Bem, the most cultivated in military science, and the first general in the Hungarian army. Klapka is of a tall, slender stature, and fine personal appearance. He is now in London.

## MAURICE PERCZEL

Belongs to a numerous family in the county of Tolna this side the Danube. He there commenced his political career, which he continued in the county of Comorn. He also frequently took part in the assemblies of the county of Pesth. He was then the opponent of Count Stephen Szécheny—a man whose liberal views were distorted by aristocratic prejudices. He filled an important post in the department of the interior under Szemere in the ministry of 1848. He was one of the thirty-six who voted against the policy of that department, which was not sufficiently decided to meet his approval, and thereupon gave up his situation. In Pesth he organized the Zrinyi battalion as the first battalion of Hungarian Honvéds, and marched against Jellachich. His military operations on either side of the Danube, and on the Drave, which have been briefly touched upon, were generally attended with happy results. They show a union of boldness, courage, and firmness, rather than military science. Perczel is a man of forty years, of a fearless mien. He is with Kossuth in Schumla.

## JOHN DAMJANICS

Was born in the year 1805 at Stasa, in the military frontiers, and of course received a military education. He was at first a cadet in his own district, and afterwards an officer in the 61st regiment of infantry, where he rose to the rank of captain. When the Revolution broke out, he left his regiment, and became commander of a Honvéd battalion. He was in the campaign against the Servians from July, 1848, to March, 1849. Partly from his deeds of bravery during this period, and partly from the prudent management of his troops, he was gradually advanced to the rank of general. Early in March he was recalled from the south. He lead the assault upon Szolnok, and, as commander of the third corps, took an active part in the victorious advances of the army up to the relief of Comorn. When he had been persuaded by Görgey to accept provisionally the charge of the war ministry, and was paying his farewell visits previous to departing for Debreczin, he seriously injured his foot by jumping from his carriage. While still suffering from this cause, in the closing catastrophe, he

took command of the fortress of Arad, which, at Görgey's order, and especially because the garrison was made up of Wallachian troops, he soon after surrendered to the Russians.

From more than thirty actions, Damjanics had always come out the victor. When he left the south, he issued a proclamation to the Servians exhorting them to quietness, which closed with these words: "If I come back, and find that you have again been burning, robbing, and murdering, I will put you all to the sword, and then, that there may not be one Servian left alive, shoot myself." His being disabled was the worst of misfortunes for Hungary; for if he had remained in the army, Görgey could never have consummated his treachery. He had already formed an opposition to that general's ambitious plans; and, by his own popularity in the army, would have been sure to frustrate them.

Damjanics was a stout, large man, of a martial appearance. He was hung on the 6th of October, at Arad. At the place of execution, where he was obliged, from six till half past ten o'clock in the morning, to look upon the murder of his comrades, he did not show the least agitation, but, turning to an Austrian officer, asked very quietly, "How

is it that I, who in battle used to be the first, am now the last?"

## LOUIS AULICH

Was born at Presburg in the year 1793. His parents were wealthy, and cherished liberal opinions. At the close of his studies he entered himself a cadet in the second regiment of infantry. Owing to his irreproachable conduct and extensive knowledge, he was promoted, step by step, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel of the same regiment. While he was in this post the Revolution broke out. He did not long hesitate to take sides with the cause of humanity and justice, and immediately placed himself and his regiment at the disposition of the Hungarian ministry.

He became colonel, and distinguished himself at Scwechat, as afterwards whenever opportunity offered during the winter campaign which he made under Görgey. After the battle of Kápolna he was made a general, and in that rank took part in various battles. The happy issue of the battle of Isaszeg is mainly due to the timely attack which he conducted.

When the main army under Görgey advanced upon Comorn, Aulich remained with his corps before Pesth.

The blockade was completed by the divisions of Asboth and Kmety, and soon caused the Austrian army that held possession to leave the city.

After the taking of Ofen, Aulich left the army for the sake of restoring his health, which was much broken, and soon took the management of the war ministry. When the dreadful catastrophe of Arad came, he was in Görgey's head-quarters, and so fell into the hands of the enemy. He was one of the best and bravest among our generals, of the most distinguished among our patriots. He died on the gallows, at Arad, the 6th of October.

#### JOSEPH BEM

Was a general in the last Polish insurrection against Russia, and is well known for his active participation in the affairs of Poland, and for his misfortunes. He was born at Tamow, in Galicia, in 1795. He pursued his studies at Cracow, and at a later period in the military school at Warsaw. On their completion he entered the Polish artillery-service, in which he made the campaign of 1812 against Russia in Davoust's corps, and then in Macdonald's. After the peace he remained in the Polish army under the Rus-

sians, was made captain and adjutant of General Bontemps in 1819, and became an instructor in the artillery school at Warsaw, a position that ill-suited him, and which he desired to escape from. He was relieved from his office, but for unknown reasons recalled, tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to a confinement of two months. He now left the army, and from 1825 to the outbreak of the insurrection in November, 1830, mostly busied himself with studies in mathematics and mechanics. Among other things he gave much attention to the steam-engine, upon which he wrote a short treatise, as he had previously done in regard to the introduction of congreve-rockets. He greeted the insurrection in Poland as the rising of a new day for his country. He hastened to Warsaw, where the government appointed him major and commander of a battery of flying-artillery. After the action of Iganie, in which he distinguished himself, he was made lieutenant-colonel; after the battle of Ostrolenka, a colonel; and soon following this, promoted to the command-in-chief of the Polish artillery. At the decisive battle of Warsaw, his genius as well as his fortunes seem to have forsaken him. All the military men and the patriots have accused him of negligence, and charged upon him the greatest share of the burden of blame for the mis-



fortunes of the day. He took refuge in the Prussian dominions, whence he conducted the emigration to France. At Paris, where he was on terms of friendship with Leluel, the former president of the Polish national committee, he proposed to lead to Don Pedro a Polish legion. But although the agreement was settled, the expedition failed. Bem was wounded by a pistol-shot from an unknown hand. He went alone to Portugal, and, after being thanked for the offer of his services, to Madrid, where he was met with a repulse. From that time he resided in Paris. The Polytechnic Society which he founded there was dissolved after a year's existence, owing to the want of funds. He then occupied himself with special branches of mechanics. In October, 1848, Bem repaired to Vienna, and undertook the organization of the Garde Mobile, and the management of the military arrangements. His plan of making a sally from the city on the 23d of October, for the purpose of cutting off and destroying the Austrian army of observation that was between Währing and Nussdorf, was frustrated by one of his adjutants. On the 27th of the same month, he conducted the defense of the suburb of the Jägerzeile, which, owing to the occupation of Landstrasse, fell, in spite of a desperate resistance, into the hands of the enemy. That

day Bem was wounded by a musket-shot. He foresaw, meanwhile, that Vienna must fall, and that he would be one of the first demanded by Windischgrätz. He therefore left the city the same day, disguised as a coachman. He was fortunate enough to reach Hungary in safety. In Pesth he was again attacked by one of his countrymen in his own chamber, and slightly wounded by a pistol-shot. After his recovery he undertook the command of the Hungarian army in Transylvania. His operations in that country, which have already been briefly narrated, bear witness to his skill in strategy and tactics, and stamp him as a rare genius, and one of the first generals of the age.

After the fall of Görgey, Bem succeeded in making his escape to Turkey, where, merely from his thorough hatred of Russia, he became a Mohammedan, and is now a pasha and commandant of the Turkish artillery.

#### GENERAL HENRY DEMBINSKY

Was born in the Waiwodeschaft of Cracow in 1791. The ardent patriotism which has ever distinguished him, was mainly an inheritance from his father, Ignatius Dembinsky, who was one of the most zealous patriots, and

a provincial deputy to the Diet of 1788, which formed the new constitution of the 3d of May, and had impressed upon his sons the importance of preserving and revising that work. He was carefully educated by his mother, a daughter of Count Maszynski, grand-master of the household at the court of Saxony. He early distinguished himself by his skill in bodily exercises, as well as progress in intellectual studies. In the year 1807, he came with two of his brothers to the Academy of Engineers, at Vienna. When, in 1809, the Austrian government offered the Polish students the post of officers in the army, he refused to accept, and returned to give his strength to his country. Before accepting the rank of an officer, he wished to earn a claim to it on the field of battle, and entered the fifth regiment of jägers as a private. At the opening of the campaign against Russia he was a lieutenant. At the battle of Smolensk, he had the gratification of being named captain by Napoleon himself. During the war in Germany, he was under Gen. Sokolnicki, to whom he felt himself particularly indebted for his military education. In this war he lost three of his brothers. He afterwards studied the business of military organization under the minister of war, Wulohorsky, who then had his office, which Dembinsky entered, in Paris.

When Constantine was placed at the head of the Polish army, he retired to his estates in the province of Cracow. In 1825 he was chosen provincial deputy to the Diet. At the breaking out of the revolution, on the 29th of November, 1830, he saw himself passed by, when the organizing of forces in his Waiwodeschaft was first undertaken. But the zeal, energy, and skill that he displayed, as chief of his district, in forming a guard of safety, drew upon him the eyes of all his fellow-citizens. In a few weeks he was placed at the head of the management for organizing the regular forces that the province of Cracow could send to the field, to consist of two regiments of cavalry and as many of infantry.

He drove this business so actively and successfully, that, on the day of the battle at Grochow, he entered Warsaw with a handsome regiment, and took his place in the line. Skrzynecki, the general-in-chief, placed him over a brigade of cavalry. With this brigade, numbering about 4,000 men, Dembinsky, in the fight at Kuflow, held at bay through the whole action the army of Field-Marshal Diebitsch, numbering 60,000. For this brilliant service he was appointed general-of-brigade. He again received command of a corps of the same strength to make an attack

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upon the city of Ostrolenka on the left wing, while Skrzynecki went against the guards. He afterwards united with the division of Gen. Gielgud. He was not able to take part in another battle at Ostrolenka, and, after that battle, shared the fate of Gen. Gielgud's division. When the generals of this division resolved to pass the Prussian frontier, Dembinsky took the bold course of breaking his way through a country swarming with enemies, and reaching Warsaw. To execute his plan, it was necessary to make a circuit of 900 leagues, going up to the sources of the Nilia and the Niemen. At the close of July, 1831, he suddenly appeared, with his little band of heroes, before the gates of Warsaw, and was joyfully admitted by the sorely-pressed inhabitants. He was immediately named governor of the city, and commander-in-chief, which offices, however, he held but a few days. It was said that, on the day following the night of the 15th of August, he formed the design of raising himself to the dictatorship, that so, perhaps, he might save the independence of his country. But his violent character had caused dissension between many of his countrymen and himself, and his plan was frustrated. He went with Rybinski's corps to Prussia, and thence to France. In the year 1833, he entered the service of

the Pasha of Egypt, who sent him to Syria to attend to the reorganization of the Egyptian army. He soon returned to Paris.

In Jan., 1849, Dembinsky appeared in Hungary, where Kossuth at first intrusted him with the command of the army of the Upper Theiss, and afterwards with that of the main army. His harsh, suspicious nature but too soon made him enemies of the other generals. This circumstance was perhaps the cause that the battle of Kápolna, on the 26th and 27th of February, 1849, was not brilliantly won in our favor. But the escape of Schlick's corps on the 14th of February near Putnok, (Tornyalla,) and the check of Egerfarmos on the 1st of March were undoubtedly the results of his bad generalship. They led to a vote expressing want of confidence passed by the corps of officers, in consequence of which he was obliged to resign. Towards the end of April, the government placed him at the head of the northern army. In May he threw up the command, because permission was not granted him to make an attack upon Galicia. After the Russian invasion, he was enabled once more to gain the favor of the government, and was named commander-in-chief of the main army. How far he justified the great confidence reposed in him by Kossuth, can be

judged from his giving up the line of the Theiss, and from the battle before Temesvár. Kossuth now acknowledged in one of his writings, in spite of his former unpardonable prejudice in his favor, what others saw before, that Dembinsky "is a man weakened by age and of a failing memory." As it seems to me, he has perhaps more to answer for in the unhappy issue of our affairs than even Görgey himself, who became a traitor partly because of him. Dembinsky is of middle stature, a stout frame, and iron-gray hair. He is at present with Kossuth in Schumla.

## NOTES.

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### NOTE A.

#### THE CAMARILLA.

*Spanish*—a little chamber. A kind of secret cabinet not recognized in the Constitution, and generally composed of the relations of the prince, priests, intriguing women, etc. In the present instance, the most prominent members of the Camarilla were Cibini, one of the ladies of the court, and the Archduchess Sophia.

### NOTE B.

The Honvéds spoken of frequently in the text, are the national soldiery of Hungary.











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